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INTRODUCTION

Armed conflict creates the need for humanitarian aid. International law
creates the mechanisms by which parties provide humanitarian aid and cre
ates obligations in connection thereto. The 1949 Geneva Conventions 1 (the
*

J.D. 2004

Four documents make up the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which govern the treatment of
certain groups during armed conflict. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S 31
[hereinafter First Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter Third Convention];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Convention]; collectively, the 1949 Geneva Con
ventions (the "Geneva Conventions" or the "Conventions"). Although the details differ depending
on the category of non-combatant, a number of articles are consistent from Convention to Conven
tion and require the same level of care from parties to the conflict. T hese include the first three
articles of each of the four Conventions [hereinafter Common Article 1, Common Article 2 and
1.
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"Conventions") form the humanitarian backdrop against which war is
waged. The Conventions establish an impartiality standard in that they grant
to humanitarian organizations the right of access to non-combatants during
2
armed conflict. In the United States, the International Emergency Economic
3
Powers Act ("IEEPA") establishes a Presidential determination standard for
humanitarian organizations acting in situations of armed conflict that allows
the President to restrict and prohibit humanitarian organizations' activities
without considering their impartiality. 4 Current circumstances present the
need for immediate impartial humanitarian aid in armed conflicts to which
5
the United States is a party. Contemporaneous use of IEEPA creates an
6
imminent risk of a violation of the Conventions.
The Conventions create a guarantee of protection and care to non
7
combatant military and civilian participants in an armed conflict and a right
of access for impartial humanitarian organizations in order to facilitate that
8
protection and care. Common Article 3 states than an obligation exists to
9
provide care. This obligation to provide care has been acknowledged to

Common Article 3) and the ninth article of the First, Second and Third Conventions, which appears
as the tenth article of the Fourth Convention [hereinafter Common Article 9/ I OJ.
2.
This right is given only to humanitarian organizations that are impartial and do not discriminate among those whom they aid. See Common Article 3, supra note I; see also infra Part I.A.
3.

International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2000).

4.

Id. § 1702.

At the writing of this Note, the United States has a military presence in Afghanistan and
5.
in Iraq. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. II 2002) (authorizing the use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq).

Both countries are receiving humanitarian aid from the United States government and various aid
organizations and each country is a party to the Conventions. See Convention de Geneive pour
/ 'ameileoration du son des blesseis et des maladies dans /es forces armeies en compagne, Champ
d'application des quatre conventions, 26, 28 (June ], 2004) available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/
rs/i5/0.518.12.fr.pdf [hereinafter Champ d 'application], listing signatories to the Conventions as of
June I, 2004 as placed on deposit at the Departement Federal des Affaires Etrangeres, Switzerland.
6.
The U.S. ratified the Conventions with no relevant reservations. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441
(2000) (including within war crimes any violation of Common Article 3). The United States also

implemented the relevant portions of the Conventions. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d

152, 164-65 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd and remanded, 2006 WL
1764793 (U.S. June 29, 2006); United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 797 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
("Article 129 of Geneva ID is clearly non-self-executing, as it calls for implementing legislation;
however, the remainder of the provisions do not expressly or impliedly require any action by Con
gress, other than ratification by the Senate, to take effect.").
7.

See Common Article 3, supra note I; Common Article 9/10, supra note I.

8.

Id; see also FRANCOISE SOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HUMANITARIAN
LAW 321 (Laura Brav ed. & trans., 2002) ("International humanitarian law clearly recognises the
right of the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") and any other impartial humanitar
ian body to undertake relief and protection operations, in conformity with the applicable
conventions." ).
9.

See Common Article 3, supra note I ("The wounded and sick shall be collected and

cared for"); COMMENTARY IV: GENEVA CONVENTIONS RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN
PERSONS OF WAR IN TIME OF WAR 40 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY IV]
("[Common Article 3] expresses a categorical imperative. . ."). The Commentaries, drawn up and
published by the ICRC in the years immediately following 1949, as a result of its role in the Con
ventions' creation, negotiation and drafting, are the definitive interpretation of the Conventions. See

Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 795 n.6.
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allocate to humanitarian organizations the right to provide this care. 1 0 Any
party to a conflict that is also a signatory 1 1 to the Conventions (a "Party"
under the Conventions' terminology)1 2 must ensure that it fulfills the guaran

tee of protection and care and that these organizations have access to non
combatants in need of aid.13 As a signatory, the United States bears this obli

gation whatever the other party's or parties' status is with respect to the
Conventions.14

The Conventions specify that impartial humanitarian organizations have
5
both a general right of access to aid non-combatants,1 and specific duties to

ensure and implement the provision of goods such as food, medical sup
plies, and other articles necessary for the preservation of life. 1 6 The duty
arises in part when the Parties delegate their obligations17 either by formal
agreement or by default, and in part when an organization exercises its right
10.
See supra note 8; COMMENTARY I: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF
THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 58 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,
1952) [hereinafter COMMENTARY I] (noting that, unlike the limited access available to the ICRC in
earlier wars, Common Article 3 "has placed matters on a different footing, an impartial humanitar

ian organization now being legally entitled to offer its services.").
11.
The Conventions do not define the term "Party," but the commentaries to each of the
Conventions describe the term as including parties to a conflict, and other neutral, allied or enemy
nations involved. COMMENTARY III: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRIS
ONERS OF WAR 26 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter COMMENTARY III].

12.
At the time of writing, 190 countries, including Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and North Korea,
were signatories ("High Contracting Parties") to the Conventions. Champ d'application, supra note 5.
13.

See supra notes IO and 11.

14.

Common Article 2 reads in relevant part:

[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed con
flict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of
war is not recognized by one of them.

Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Pow
ers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and
applies the provisions thereof.
Common Article 2, supra note I. Furthermore:
[The Geneva Conventions] are coming to be regarded less and less as contracts concluded on a
basis of reciprocity in the national interests of the parties and more and more as a solemn af
firmation of principles respected for their own sake, a series of unconditional engagements on
the part of each of the Contracting Parties vis-a-vis the others.
COMMENTARY III, supra note 11, at 20. Where a party is a non-signatory and has not accepted and
applied the provisions of the Conventions pursuant to Common Article 2, supra note I, customary

international law will deem that the Conventions apply. See The Secretary General, Repon of the
Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 'lI 35, U.N.
Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (''The part of conventional international humanitarian law which has
beyond doubt become part of international customary law is the law applicable in armed conflict as
embodied in: the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 . . . . ).
"

15.

See Common Article 3, supra note I; Common Article 9/10, supra note I.

16.

See, e.g., Third Convention, supra note I,

17.

See supra note 15.

23, 55, 59, 61.

art.

73; Fourth Convention, supra note I, arts.
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to access which, once exercised, results in an obligation to comply with the
Conventions' demands.18 Humanitarian organizations subject to the United
States' jurisdiction19 routinely export items in connection with their opera
2
tions from the United States. 0 These organizations also use donated funds to
2
purchase goods within the zone of conflict. 1
The President can use IEEPA to broadly limit these activities, restricting

humanitarian organizations and inhibiting the United States' performance of
22
its obligations under the Conventions. Congress passed IEEPA in 1977 to

grant to the President broad authority to prohibit or otherwise restrict mone

tary and other property transactions involving a foreign person during times
2
of national emergency and in similar situations. 3 Humanitarian donations of
24
goods are exempt from this authority. Congress delegated to the President

18. When a Party to a conflict is unable to fulfill its obligations under the Fourth Convention,
these duties are delegated to a Protecting Power, often an impartial humanitarian organization. See
Fourth Convention, supra note I, art. 11; COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, GENEVA CONVENTIONS
FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 84-9, at 6 (1955). These delegable obli
gations include the provision of aid. See Fourth Convention, supra note I, art. 61. Other
international treaties create similar obligations for humanitarian organizations. See, e.g., Int'!
Comm. of the Red Cross, Report on the Activity of the International Committee ofthe Red Cross for
the Indemnification of Former Allied Prisoners of War in Japanese Hands, Article I6 of the Peace
Treaty of 8 September 1951 Between the Allied Powers and Japan 5 (1971) (equating the ICRC's
role thereunder to its role under the Conventions, and describing the ICRC's "responsibilities" and
"mandate").

19. IEEPA applies to "donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2). For an individual's charitable donations to be deductible for purposes of
federal and state taxes, the recipient organization must comply with Internal Revenue Code section
170(c)(2)(A), which requires incorporation in a U.S. state and thus creates U.S. jurisdiction over
both the donor and the recipient organization. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 796 (7th ed. 1998). Donations made by U.S. persons to an organization outside of
United States jurisdiction where a subsequent transfer of the articles could also fall within IEEPA,
depending on how many degrees of separation the President deems applicable. See Peter L. Fitzger
ald, Hidden Dangers in the £-Commerce Data Mine: Governmental Customer and Trading Panner
Screening Requirements, 35 INT'L LAW 47, 52 (2001) (discussing the reach of IEEPA and similar
prohibitions by stating that "those who engage in impermissible dealings with blacklisted compa
nies may, in tum, find themselves blacklisted").
20. For example, Medecins Sans Frontieres I Doctors Without Borders ("MSF') regularly
ships food and medical supplies to countries within which it works, including Iraq and Afghanistan.
See Independent Aid in Iraq Virtually Impossible, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIEREs!DOCTORS WITHOUT
BORDERS, Apr. 23, 2004, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/2004/04-23-2004.efm; Press
Release, Medecins Sans Frontiers/Doctors Without Borders, Alarming Food Crisis in Northern
Afghanistan (Feb. 21, 2002), http://www.msf.org.
21. Potable water is one of the articles most likely to be sourced within a zone of
conflict. See Oxfam, What We Do: Water and Sanitation, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/
emergencies/how_we_work/water_sanitation.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005); CARE, CARE Inter
national in Sudan, http://www.careintemational.org.uk/cares_work/where/sudan/ (last visited Oct.
22, 2005).
22.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2).

See H.R. Res. 7738, 95th Cong. § 202 (1977) (enacted) (authority granted to deal with
23.
"unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or in substantial part outside the
United States, to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States"); see also id.
§ 203(a) (authorizing the President to prescribe regulations on transactions pursuant to § 202).

24.

The statute reads, in relevant part:
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the ability to override the exemption under certain circumstances, such as

where the President determines the donations are in conflict with national
25
security, involve coercion, or would endanger U.S. military. The exemp
tion is intended to balance individual donors' interests with those of the
26
government during a time of emergency. The override authority grants

such wide discretion to the President to place prohibitions or restrictions

on humanitarian aid that the safety net created by the Conventions can be
2
erased. 7 IEEPA does not require that the President satisfy any specific
28
independent criteria in order to override as long as he has declared a na
29
tional emergency. When the national emergency coincides with an armed
conflict involving the United States, the President's use of the override

The authority granted to the President by this section does not include the authority to regulate
or prohibit, directly or indirectly ...
( 2) donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of articles, such as
food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering, except to the ex
tent that the President determines that such donations (A) would seriously impair his ability to
deal with any national emergency declared under section 1701 of this title, (B) are in response
to coercion against the proposed recipient or donor, or (C) would endanger Armed Forces of
the United States which are engaged in hostilities or are in a situation where imminent in
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; ...
50 u.s.c.

§ 1702(b).

25.

Id.

26.

See S. REP. No. 95-466, at 5 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4540, 4544

("The exercise of emergency controls would be restricted in order to enable U.S. persons to make
humanitarian contributions in accordance with their consciences ...").
27.

50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2). Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, courts have

referred more frequently to the override section of IEEPA. For instance, Global Relief Foundation,

Inc. v. O 'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002) states that:
Congress did not include any sort of temporal or geographic limitation on the President's abil
ity to block humanitarian aid. There is no statement that the President can only block the
distribution of international aid or that he can only block aid to specific foreign persons in
specified foreign locations. Instead, Congress enacted broad, sweeping language which author
ized the President to block any and all humanitarian efforts by the targeted entity so long as he
declares that the provision of such relief would jeopardize his ability to deal with a national
emergency.

Id. at 795. It is relevant that the Global Relief court was commenting in a case regarding an Islamic
charity in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. The court's wide reading of the President's
IEEPA powers in this case is likely to be used as precedent in other situations even only tangentially
related to September 11.
28.

See S. REP. No. 95-466, at 5 (noting the President's authority to prohibit any donations

of humanitarian articles which could "subvert, contravene, or preclude effective exercise of emer
gency authority"). It is only the President who must determine that the conditions are satisfied. 50
U.S.C. § l 702(b)(2)(A)-( C).
29.

The relevant statute states:

Any authority granted to the President by § 1702 of this title may be exercised to deal with any
unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the
United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the
President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.
50 U.S.C. § 170l(a)( l).
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authority is both politically detrimental and a potential violation of the
United States' international obligations. 30
The United States' current military actions threaten the guarantees of the
Conventions. The invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, the war in Iraq
beginning in early 2003, and the ongoing and imprecise war against terror
31
ism each requires adherence to the humanitarian rules of the Conventions.
The George W. Bush administration has stated that it considers both Iraq
32
and Afghanistan to be supporting terrorist activities, creating a likelihood
of broad use of the override authority in each conflict. Neither country has
33
sufficient resources to maintain its population. The Conventions' minimum
requirements for humane treatment require provision of certain goods such
as medical supplies that often are not available in the location of a conflict. 34
An impartial humanitarian organization carrying out its obligation to ensure
the rights of a non-combatant needs to furnish goods from outside the zone
of conflict. When the organization brings these needed articles from the
United States the supplies come under the purview of IEEPA and therefore
are subject to the override authority.35
For example, consider a United States charity that provided food, medi
cal care and tents for displaced persons in Iraq during the period of active
military activity between the United States and Iraq. The Conventions apply
36
to this situation of armed conflict. The organization, therefore, has a right

30. A violation of the Conventions by the United States might be used by other countries as
justification for ignoring the Conventions when the United States' interest in upholding humanitar
ian law is greater; for example, if armed conflict were to exist on U.S. territory. See, e.g., LOUIS
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 210-11 (1996) ("Particularly as regards
multilateral treaties of general applicability . . . inconsistent legislation by Congress not only vio
lates international obligations but ruptures international consensus which the President-and-Senate
helped achieve.").
31. The Conventions apply to all international armed conflicts. Common Article 2, supra
note 1 ("[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties .. . ).
"

32. See President George W. Bush, Address to the Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001)
(transcript available at 2001 WL 1104160) ("Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda"); President
George W. Bush, Weekly Radio Address (Mar. 22, 2003) (transcript available at 2003 WL1441066)
(condemning the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for its support of Al Qaeda, noting Al Qaeda's con
trol over the Taliban, and stating that "our mission is clear ... to end Saddam Hussein's support for
terrorism").
33. See Open Borders to Iraqis, CNN.com, Mar. 19, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/
WORLD/meast/03/19/sprj.iraq.aid/index.html ("Sixty percent of Iraqis depend entirely on food
rations imported under the U.N.'s oil-for-food programs, and household supplies could run out
within weeks if distributions stop."); Press Release, Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without
Borders, Alarming food crisis in nonhem Afghanistan, supra note 20.
34. See supra note 20. The Conventions include an obligation to provide food and medical
supplies, see Fourth Convention, supra note I, art. 55.
35. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2) (2000); see also Veterans Peace Convoy, Inc. v. Schultz, 722
F. Supp. 1425, 1432 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (holding that § I702(b)(2) covers articles "which the donor
intends to be used to relieve human suffering if the articles can reasonably be expected to serve that
purpose").
36.

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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of access to all non-combatant Iraqis and certain obligations to provide aid37

as long as its actions are impartial. The frequent acts of terrorism38 com
bined with the significant humanitarian needs in Iraq raise the distinct
possibility that members of terrorist organizations need aid. It is unlikely

that the organization could both satisfy the requirement of impartiality-i.e.,
provide food and care without discrimination to those in need-and at the

same time avoid aiding those whom the United States might deem terrorists.
This situation can trigger,39 and has triggered, 40 application of the override
authority.

1
Executive Order 13,224,4 issued on September 23, 200 1, is a recent use

of the override authority in connection with an armed conflict to which the

United States is a party, and provides an example of IEEPA's breadth. The

President attached to this Order a list of entities affirmatively subject to the
2
prohibitions and restrictions authorized by Section 1702(b)(2).4 The list

includes any persons who provide support to or associate with the persons
listed or otherwise designated in the Order.43 The Order permits the Secre

tary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Attorney General, to add to the list at his discretion.44 The Order also in

cludes a specific reference to humanitarian donations and prohibits
5
donations to any person designated by, or later included within, the Order.4

The Order applies in all situations of armed conflict, including Afghanistan

and Iraq at the writing of this Note, and restricts humanitarian aid with such

37.

See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.

38. In October 2004, the United Nations Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee added
the al-Zarqawi network to the list of terrorist organizations subject to Security Council Resolution
1267.Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Committee Adds One Entity to Al Qaeda
Section of Consolidated List, U.N.Dec. S/8219 (October 18, 2004).
39. 50 U.S.C. § l 702(b)(2) (the override authority applies to "donations ... of articles such
as food, clothing and medicine ").
40. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. § 786 (2001), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1701 (West 2005). The order was issued pursuant to IEEPA following Presidential findings that an
increased risk of terrorism existed in the United States which merited heightened regulation of fi
nancial and other transactions, including donations of the articles listed in § l 702(b)(2). Id.
Executive Order 13,224 was amended in 2005 to broaden the scope of the override to include dona
tions "by," "or for the benefit of' persons included on the list, where Executive Order 13,224 had
originally included only donations "to" such persons.Exec. Order 13,372, 70 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Feb.
18, 2005).During 2003 and using similar language, President Bush invoked the override authority in
connection with Iraq, Exec.Order No. B,315, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,315 ( Sept. 3, 2003), reprinted in 50
U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West 2005), Burma, Exec.Order No.13,310, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,853 (July 30, 2003),
reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West 2005), and the former Yugoslavia, Exec. Order No. 13,304,
68 Fed. Reg. 32,315 (May 29, 2003), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West 2005).President Clin
ton invoked the override authority in 1995 in connection with negotiations regarding the peace
process in the Middle East.Exec.Order No.12,947, 60 Fed. Reg.5,079 (Jan.25, 1995), reprinted in
50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (2000).
41.

Exec. Order No.13,224.

42.

Exec.Order No.13,224, at annex.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.
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breadth that the United States could be in breach of its obligations under the
Conventions.46
This Note argues that, should the President exercise his override author

ity to prohibit or restrict the donation of humanitarian articles during an

armed conflict involving the United States, the resulting prohibition or re
striction would cause the United States to violate its obligations under the

Conventions. This Note does not assert that the United States should not

have the ability to put in place controls to prevent terrorists from benefiting
7
from donations of funds and other humanitarian items;4 instead, it asserts
that domestic law must tread as lightly and narrowly as possible where a

widely accepted multilateral treaty exists and that domestic law ought not to
8
override humanitarian law4 under the later-in-time rule unless absolutely

necessary. IEEPA's breadth permits, and the war on terror and related con
flicts are likely to encourage, restrictions and prohibitions that disrupt the

balance that the Conventions demand. Part I contends that when the Presi
dent exercises the full power granted to him in the override authority, such
action violates international law because the restrictions permitted by

IEEPA conflict with humanitarian organizations' right of access under the

Conventions. Part II discusses the implications of a violation of the Conven

tions on both the international and domestic planes. Part II demonstrates that
9
an analysis under the Charming Bets/ doctrine does not necessarily dis
pose of the question, and that Congress's established ability to override

treaties under the later-in-time doctrine is inapplicable in this case, where
IEEPA's lack of specificity creates legal difficulties and political dilemmas
for the United States.

I . IEEPA AUTHORIZE S A B REACH OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN L AW

Given the range of authority granted to the President under IEEPA, a

Presidential nullification of the humanitarian donation exemption can via-

46. The Order was issued to help combat terrorist activities, and therefore applies to all
aspects of the "war on terror, " and individually to the United States' presence in Iraq and Afghani
stan. Exec. Order No. 13,224 (listing in the preamble the "the continuing and immediate threat of
further attacks on United States nationals or the United States " as the basis for the order).
47. See The Role of Charities and NGO's in the Financing of Terrorist Activities: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Int'/ Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs,
107th Cong. 3 (2002) [hereinafter Role of Charities and NGO 's] (statement of Sen. Evan Bayh)
("[L]egitimate charities have been exploited when their field operations have been infiltrated by
terrorist elements, particularly in areas of conflict. ... Today's hearing will examine how terrorist
groups exploit charities and NGOs and ways to curtail the flow of money to these organizations
while preserving humanitarian aid.").
48. Humanitarian law is generally considered to be the set of rules that govern armed con
flicts. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian
law: Overlaps, Gaps and A mbiguities, in 1 International Criminal Law 617, 617 (M. Cherif Bas
siouni ed., 2d ed., 1999) (defining humanitarian law as "that body of norms that protects certain
categories of persons and property and prohibits attacks against them ... be they of an international
or non-international character.").
49. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) ("an act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other construction remains ... ).
"
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late the Conventions by improperly limiting the activities of impartial hu
manitarian organizations during armed conflict. Section I.A argues that

despite the absence of a definition of "impartial" in the text, it is possible

and necessary to distinguish between organizations that have rights and ob

ligations under the Conventions and those that can be validly restricted. It

then discusses the role of impartial humanitarian organizations within the
Conventions, and concludes that such organizations have a right to access, a

right to deliver aid, and, when they have exercised those rights, obligations

toward each non-combatant during armed conflicts. Section l.B provides

examples that illustrate the potential for conflict between the right of access

granted to impartial humanitarian organizations by the Conventions and the

implementation of the override authority. It concludes that IEEPA's Presi
dential determination standard improperly limits the activities of these

organizations.

A. Impartiality and the Rights of Impartial Humanitarian
Organizations under the Conventions
The Conventions' text sets forth the minimum aid requirements with
50
which Parties must comply. Parties must provide certain levels of care and

protection without discrimination to non-combatants in situations of armed
5
conflict. 1 Per the Conventions' text and the Commentaries as their definitive
5
interpretation, 2 impartial humanitarian organizations play a significant role

50. COMMENTARY IV , supra note 9, at 37 ("[T]he applicable provisions [of Common Article
3] represent a compulsory minimum."). The Conventions are a complement to the Hague Conven
tions of 1899 and 1907, which codify the laws and customs of war.See Convention with Respect to
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat.1803, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter Laws
and Customs of War of 1899]; Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.The predecessor 1864 Geneva Convention stated that
wounded or sick combatants, to whatever nation they belong, shall be collected and cared for. Con
vention intemationale au sujet des militaires blesses sur Jes champs de bataille, art. 6, Aug.22, 1864,
22 Stat. 940, T.S. No. 377. The same philosophy underlies the 1949 Conventions, promulgated in
reaction to the conduct of Nazi Germany and Japan and the conditions in which many of the thirty
eight million combatant and non-combatant casualties of World War II lost their lives.See David A.
Elder, The Historical Background of Common A rticle 3 ofthe Geneva Convention of 1949, 11 CASE
W. RES. J.INT'L. L. 37 (1979).
51. See, e.g., Third Convention, supra note I, art.16 ("[A]ll prisoners of war shall be treated
alike ... without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opin
ions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria"); Fourth Convention, supra note l, art. 13
("The provisions ... cover the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict, without any
adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion."). Non
discrimination can be taken as a proxy for impartiality, given the text of the non-discrimination
clauses and the interpretation of impartiality as discussed herein. The Conventions do not define
impartiality explicitly, but do provide direction for the international community to define humanitar
ian organizations to which the Conventions apply. Although the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") has not yet addressed the definition of impartiality, other courts have cited the United Na
tions ("UN") as an example. See Cyprus v.Turkey, App.No. 6780174 and 6950175, 2 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 125 ("a neutral and impartial organization such as the UN"). The Commentaries
to the Conventions address impartiality more specifically, stating that humanitarian organizations
"must not be affected by any political or military consideration," and yet "it should be noted that
impartiality does not necessarily mean mathematical equality." COMMENTARY I, supra note 10.
52.

See supra note 11.
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5
in the implementation of and adherence to these requirements. 3 There is an
omnipresent danger that Parties will tend toward their inherent biases, and
therefore the Conventions give impartial participants a role. Once involved,

these impartial participants have an obligation to act in order to ensure com
5
pliance with the Conventions. 4 It is important to ascertain a clear definition

of "impartial" because terrorists have the ability to obtain funding through
organizations that, while superficially charitable, do not act in an im8artial

manner and should not benefit from the Conventions' rights of access.

Both the Conventions and IEEPA protect against the risk of terrorist

funding, but IEEPA goes beyond what is necessary and limits legitimate and

necessary aid. Only when an organization meets the impartiality standard do
56
Humanitarian

the Convention rights and consequent obligations attach.

organizations are conscious of the need to adhere to the impartiality stan
5
dard in order to ensure their ability to insist on a right of access. 7 Thus,

53.

The general right of access to aid the four categories of non-combatants and the obliga

tions attached thereto extend not just to ICRC but also to other "impartial humanitarian bod[ies]."

See Common Article 3, supra note I; Common Article 9/10, supra note I. The official commentar

ies of the Conventions repeatedly refer to other impartial organizations, compelling the conclusion

that the ICRC is not the only entity that can fill this role. See COMMENTARY

ill, supra note 11, at 35

("[T]he wording finally adopted .. . provides a legal basis for interventions by the International
Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization" (emphasis added)).
One example of an impartial humanitarian organization is OXFAM, which is "dedicated to fighting
poverty

and

related

injustice

around

the

world."

Oxfam

International,

Who

We

Are,

http://www.oxfam.org/eng/about_ who.htm (last viewed Oct. 22, 2005). Other examples are CARE
and MSF, the latter of which was established with the objective of "providing medical aid wherever
needed, regardless of race, religion, politics or sex." MSF, http://www.msf.org (last viewed Oct. 22,
2005).
54.

See COMMENTARY I, supra note 10; see also Mary Ellen O'Connell, Humanitarian Assis

tance in Non-International Armed Conflict: The Founh Wave of Rights, Duties and Remedies, 31
lsR. YEARBOOK ON HUM. RTS., 183, 183 (2002) ("[A]id, when offered by the State, seldom comes
without strings... . Usually governments' concerns are the same as those of the NGOs. There are
many cases, though, when the State's agenda is at odds with basic humanitarian beliefs.").
55.

See supra note 47.

56.

All of these rights are enforceable against the High Contracting Parties. See Common

Article

I, supra note I; see also COMMENTARY I, supra note 10, at 26 ("[I]n the event of a Power

failing to fulfill its obligations, the other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) may, and
should endeavor to bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Convention."). Although the obliga
tion to comply with a treaty is implicit for the nations that have ratified it, see Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("Pacta sunt servanda: Every treaty
in force is binding upon the Parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith"), the reitera
tion of this principle in the opening article of the Conventions underscores the weight of the
obligations. See BoucHET-SAULNIER, supra note 8, at 344. The question of standing is beyond the

scope of this Note.While some might argue that the humanitarian organizations' right is worthless
without a remedy, such an argument fails because the Conventions allow a remedy, see Fourth Con
vention, supra note

I, art. 146 (obligating the Parties to enact legislation and to otherwise suppress

violations of the Conventions), and U.S. courts have intimated that they would recognize such a
remedy.See United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 799 ( "[I]t is inconsistent with both the lan
guage and the spirit of the [Third Convention] and with our professed support of its purpose to find
that the rights established therein cannot be enforced by the individual . .. ").
57.
See Humanitarian Crisis in Afghanistan: Is Enough Aid Reaching Afghanistan?: Hear
ing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., Subcomm. on East Asian and South Asian Affairs, 107th
Cong. 23 (2001) (statement of Nicolas de Torrente, Exec. Director, MSF ) (stating that impartiality
"means that humanitarian actors should not take sides and should be free from political influence, so
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organizations that are "charitable" in name only, established to channel
5
money to terrorists, do not have these rights. 8 The Conventions, therefore,
incorporate protections against the same risks that Congress tried to address
5
in drafting IEEPA. 9 Unlike prohibitions created by use of the override au
60
thority, however, the Conventions do not inhibit activities of impartial
organizations providing valid aid in satisfaction of the protective obligations
that arise during an armed conflict.

By virtue of the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross

("ICRC") in connection with the Conventions and the Commentaries and in

the development of humanitarian law, it is reasonable to incorporate its in
terpretation of the articles and its definition of impartiality into the
6
Conventions. 1 The ICRC's constitutional documents parallel the language

of the Commentaries. In describing the way in which humanitarian organi

zations determine priorities of care in delivering aid during armed conflict,

the ICRC defines impartiality as making "no discrimination as to national
6
ity, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions." 2
Other humanitarian organizations that model themselves on the ICRC

and the ICRC's interpretation of impartiality are allocated the rights and
obligations by the Conventions. The Conventions set out these rights and

obligations through general principles and more detailed articles based on

that they can go after their objective single-mindedly to impartially help people solely based on the
criteria of need.").
58. See COMMENTARY IV, supra note 9, at 98 ("A belligerent Power can obviously not be
obliged to tolerate in its territory activities of any kind by any organization." (emphasis added)).
Certain organizations identified in recent U.S. cases appear to fall outside the Conventions. See, e.g.,
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the
evidence showing that foreign terrorists held an interest in the organization's assets in the United
States was sufficient for the organization to fall within Executive Order 13,224).
59. See S. REP. No. 95-466, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4540, 4544 (stating
a goal of avoiding donations that "subvert, contravene, or preclude effective exercise of emergency
authority.").
60. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. § 786 (2001), reprinted
§ 1701 (West 2005).

as

amended in 50

U.S.C.A.

61. See Elder, supra note 50, at 38 ('"The International Committee of the Red Cross, in light
of the widespread revulsion emanating from the contemporaneous major international and national
war crimes trials, endeavored to solicit support for rectification of some of the deficiencies of hu
manitarian legal protection evidenced by the Second World War."). The ICRC drew up and
published the Commentaries to the Conventions. See supra note 12; see also O'Connell, supra note
54, at 183.
62. Proclamation of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross (1965), reprinted in IN
TERNATIONAL RED CROSS HANDBOOK 17 (12th ed. 1983). The impartiality standard does not require
an organization to fulfill every need of everyone but does subject choices about whom to aid to an
objective assessment. The editor of the Commentaries states that impartial aid "excludes subjective
differentiation." Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Peace, 239 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 79 (1984) (emphasis added). None of the Conventions, the Commentaries, or the
ICRC Statute suggests that impartial organizations must deliver aid uniformly but rather that they
must allocate resources according to need. For example, rather than utilizing a first-come, first
served basis, medicine in short supply might be allocated first to children and pregnant women, who
have weaker immune systems. See BouCHET-SAULNIER, supra note 8, at 141 ("Impartiality must
not be confused with a mathematical neutrality that would consist of providing equal aid to each
party present, under the pretext of not favoring anyone. Impartiality actually requires that relief be
given in priority to those who need it, regardless of their affiliation.").
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these principles. The general principles are common to all four Conventions.
6
The Conventions 3 delineate the broad obligation to aid non-combatants and

the mechanism by which this aid should be provided. These articles do not

set forth the maximum set of rights that a Party could, at its discretion, allo

cate to organizations, but rather the baseline on which other articles build
and provide specificity.

64
One reading of the phrase "may offer" in Common Article 3 denotes

optionality on both sides: the organization is not obliged to put forth its ser
vices, nor is the Party in control of the relevant territory compelled to accept
65
The ICRC agreed to this language on the principle that states

such an offer.

would uphold their moral obligation to involve the organizations in order to
66
facilitate aid. Numerous scholars have commented on the extreme improb
ability that the parties would exercise the apparent optionality in the text of

Common Article 3. These authors assert that it is reasonable to conclude that

the organizations have a right to be present and to fulfill the obligations con-

63.

Common Article 3, supra note 1; Common Article 9/10, supra note

I. Common Article 3

binds Parties to treat non-combatants humanely, without discrimination, and to care for the wounded
and sick, and states that "[a]n impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict." Common Article 3, supra note

I.

Although Common Article 3 by its text applies to "armed conflict not of an international character,"
the article was characterized from the outset as the "Convention in miniature," COMMENTARY I,

supra note 10, at 48 (citing an unnamed delegate), and so establishes a minimum level of protections
due to non-combatants in all armed conflicts, including civil wars. The Commentary states:
Article 3 refers only to cases of conflict not of an international character. But, if these provi
sions represent (as they do) the minimum applicable in a non-international conflict, that
minimum must a fortiori be applicable in an international conflict. That is the guiding principle
common to all the Geneva Conventions. That is their justification.

Id. at 23. The ICJ has concluded that "[t]here is no doubt that, in the event of international armed
conflicts, these rules also constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules
which also apply to international conflicts." Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
19861.C.J. 14,

U.S.),
'JI 218 (June 27); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (assert

ing subject matter jurisdiction in part on the basis that violations of Common Article 3 are violations
of the law of nations). Common Article 9/10 (as included in the Fourth Convention covering civil
ians) reads in full as follows: "The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the
humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial
humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, un
dertake for the protection of civilian persons and for their relief." Common Article 9110, supra note

I. As with Common Article 3, Common Article 9110 was incorporated to facilitate protection of
non-combatants. COMMENTARY IV, supra note 9, at 98-99 (stating that the Article was included in
order to "leave the door open for any initiative or activity, however unforeseeable today, which may
be of real assistance in protection of civilians"); see also Major Maxwell et al., Non-Governmental

Organizations and the Military, 1999-NOV ARMY LAW. 17, 21.
64.

See Common Article 3, supra note I ("[a]n impartial humanitarian body, such as the

International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.").
65.

See Elder, supra note 50, at 49.

66.

See COMMENTARY I, supra note 10, at 58 (noting that, unlike the limited access available

to the ICRC in earlier wars, Common Article 3 "has placed matters on a different footing, an impar
tial humanitarian organization now being legally entitled to offer its services"). The ICRC rejected
other language, which would have "superficially" strengthened the role of humanitarian organiza
tions, in order to preserve independence of action. Elder, supra note 50.
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sequent to that presence.67 The right of access granted by Common Articles
68
3 and 9110 is subject to few practical constraints, and humanitarian organi
zations are justified in acting in the capacities delineated in the Conventions,
and in receiving from the Parties the autonomy to do so, as long as they
69
meet the impartiality standard.
B. Conflict of IEEPA Restrictions with Convention Rights

Convention articles that cover specific types of impartial aid establish
obligations owed to non-combatants that, while conditional under certain
circumstances, cannot be abrogated by the blanket restrictions on or prohibi
tions of donations of goods that IEEPA perrnits.70 Together with the general
obligations imposed by Common Articles 3 and 9/10, these articles create a
system of aid which the Parties must adhere to and provide for in conjunc
71
tion with the ICRC or other impartial humanitarian organizations. By
72
enabling action such as Executive Order 13,224, IEEPA creates an envi
ronment in which the President can eviscerate these protections for
non-combatants, placing the United States in violation of international law.73
Although not every invocation of the override authority necessarily vio
74
lates the United States' obligations under the Conventions, IEEPA's
67. See COMMENTARY I, supra note 10, at 58 (stating that a Party incapable of fulfilling its
obligations under the Conventions which "refuses offers of charitable service from outside its fron
tiers will incur a heavy moral responsibility"); Elder, supra note 50, at 67; Denise Plattner,
Assistance to the Civilian Population: the Development and Present State of International Humani
tarian Law, 288 lNT'L REv. R ED CROSS 249, 261 (1992) ("Although the relevant text entitles it only
to offer its services, the principle that the I C R C may operate in a country ravaged by internal armed
conflict is now generally accepted ").But see Peter Macalister- Smith, Rights and duties of the agen
cies involved in providing humanitarian assistance and their personnel in armed conflict, in
ASSISTING THE VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OTHER DISASTERS 108 (Frits Kalshoven ed.,
1988) (emphasizing that for states wishing to limit humanitarian organizations' access, certain parts

of the Conventions "make this type of reaction possible ").
68. Common Article 9/1O's text, similar to Common Article 3's, might be read to allow states
to refuse aid by humanitarian organizations but the similarity of the two articles compels the same
argument as stated above for Common Article 3.See supra text accompanying notes 66 and 67.
69. See, e.g. , COMMENTARY IV, supra note 9, at 110-11 ("But being bound to apply the
Convention, [Parties] alone must bear the responsibility if they refuse to help in carrying out their
engagements"); Michael Bothe, Relief Actions: The Position of the Recipient State, in ASSISTING
THE VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OTHER DISASTERS 92 (Frits Kalshoven ed., 1988) (stating
that the Conventions create "an obligation [on the part of the Parties] to accept relief."). Bothe notes
further that the negotiating record and later statements by the signing governments support both this
interpretation and the assumption "that the requirement of a consent implies an obligation to give
this consent " except in limited situations of valid necessity.Id. at 94.
70. 50 U.S.C.§ 1702(b)(2) (listing "articles such as food, clothing and medicine" within the
override authority).
71.

See Common Articles 3 and 9/10; see also supra text accompanying notes 57 and 58.

72. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. § 786 (2001), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1701 (West 2005).
73.

50 U.S.C.§ l 702(b)(2) (2000) ; see supra text accompanying notes 36 through 40.

74. See Exec. Order No. 13,224; Exec. Order No. 13,284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4075 (Jan. 23, 2003)
(specifying a number of organizations that are not, in fact, impartial humanitarian organizations
under the definition applicable to the Conventions; however, the Executive Order directs that
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language allows Executive Orders to contain sweeping prohibitions and cre
ates no system of checks and balances to avoid such a violation. 75
Prohibiting donations of goods necessary for providing aid to non
combatants under either the general right to care of Common Articles 3 and
9/1 0, or specific rights allocated in other articles, would incapacitate hu
76
manitarian organizations in their efforts to provide aid. Such incapacitation
would result in a breach of the responsibilities the United States undertook
upon ratification and implementation of the Conventions. Comparing the
language of a number of these articles with the broad-based approach per
mitted under IEEPA demonstrates these potential conflicts.
Article 23 of the Fourth Convention requires free passage for various ba
77
sic items. Parties may require evidence that the items will not be diverted,
that control will not be ineffective, and that no "definite" military or eco
nomic advantage will accrue to the other party by the latter's use of the
78
goods as a replacement for its own supplies. Article 23's conditions appear
on their face to match a stated rationale for the IEEPA override authority: to
avoid donations that "subvert, contravene, or preclude effective exercise of
79
emergency authority."
There are differences that may lead to violations of international law.
IEEPA contains no requirement to identify the specific potential harm; a
prohibition imposed relying on the statute could therefore violate the free
passage obligations under Article 23. Article 23 goes on to say that supervi
sion by an impartial humanitarian organization can cure the risks of
80
diversion and advantage. The President's authority to prohibit under
IEEPA should be more narrowly conditional in order to not conflict with the
legal obligation to ensure free passage of goods. The override authority

additional organizations and persons may fall within its jurisdiction without conditioning such in
clusion on partiality).
75.
50 U.S.C. § 1 703 (2000) (requiring the President to report to Congress at any instance of
exercise of Presidential authority under § l 702(b )(2), but requiring consultation with Congress only
"in every possible instance").
See, e.g. , http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/art3659.html (last visited Sept. 24,
76.
2005) (describing conditions in Afghanistan in [December 200 1 ] : "Thousands of Afghans fled their
homes for refugee camps, both inside Afghanistan and in neighboring countries. Oxfam brought
emergency water systems to several of these camps, sharing with refugees the importance of sanita
tion in such close quarters. Without this intervention, thousands might have died from malaria,
diarrhea, and other preventable diseases."). Mass movement of civilians only creates additional
problems. See Macalister-Smith, supra note 67, at 1 09 (noting that lack of consent from Parties will
force humanitarian organizations to provide aid in camps in adjacent countries, resulting in migra
tion of those in need of aid).
77.

Fourth Convention, supra note 1, art. 23.

Id. An example of diversion and ineffective control is supply lines controlled by terrorist
78.
organizations, either with or without the support of the local government. An example of advantage
is provision of wheat to a party without either its own source of wheat or a substitute; the donated
wheat would free funds for other uses because of the reduced need to use the funds for food.
79.

See S. REP. No. 95-466, at 5 ( 1 977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4540, 4544.

80.

See Fourth Convention, supra note 1, art. 23. The Protecting Power obligations are often

delegated to the ICRC or another impartial humanitarian organization. See Fourth Convention, supra
note 1 , art. 1 1 .
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should be limited to situations where the President both (i) ascertained that

the delivery of articles would result in a "definite" advantage to a hostile
Party 8 1 and (ii) required specific information showing "a serious reason for
fearing"82 that the articles would be diverted to terrorists83 in order to fit
within the Conventions.84
Individually and collectively, Articles 55, 59, 63 and

142

of the Fourth

Convention permit only narrow regulation and restriction of humanitarian

organizations' role in delivering articles to protected civilians in occu ied
p
5
territory 8 and not a blanket prohibition as is possible under IEEPA.8 An
Occupying Power87 has a duty under Article 55 to ensure provision of [suffi
cient] food and medical supplies for the population, subject only to the
phrase "to the fullest extent of the means available to it."88 When, as in Iraq,

the United States is an Occupying Power,89 an invocation of the override

authority improperly limits the means available to fulfill the nation's obliga
90
tions under Article 55.
Article 63 provides limited ability to restrict impartial humanitarian or

ganizations, stating that an Occupying Power may restrict the activities only

by way of "temporary and exceptional measures . . . for urgent reasons of
81.

Fourth Convention, supra note 1 , art. 23.

82.

Fourth Convention, supra note 1, art. 23.

In some cases, the hostile party will be a country considered to be harboring or otherwise
83.
supporting terrorists. See, e.g., supra note 32.
84.
Instead, the override authority requires only a national emergency, see SO U.S.C.
l 70l (a)( l ), and satisfaction of Presidential discretion conditions. See SO U.S.C. l 702(b)(2).
85.

Fourth Convention, supra note 1, sec. ID and IV.

86.

so u.s.c. § l 702(b)(2).

87.

A territory is occupied when it is "actually placed under the authority of the hostile

army." See Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note SO, art.
42. Occupation continues until a local government establishes "full and free exercise of sover
eignty," ICRC, Occupation and international humllnitarian law: questions and answers,
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/634KFC (last visited April 8, 2004), but a situation
may revert to occupation if the hostile army retakes control in the absence of local government
consent. Id.
88.

Article SS obliges an Occupying Power to "bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical

stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate." COMMENTARY IV,
supra note 9, at 309. Article S9 requires "free passage of these consignments" subject only to the

opposing power's ability to search and regulate the consignments to ensure that the articles are
destined for "the needy population" and not the Occupying Power itself. Id. at 320 ("The obligation
on the Occupying Power to accept such relief is unconditional.").
89.

See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003) ("recognizing the specific authorities,

responsibilities, and obligations of [the United States] as [an] occupying power [in Iraq]"); see also
Asli 0. Bali, Justice under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in Iraq, 30
YALE J. INT'L L. 43 1 , 470-7 1 n. 1 24 (noting that the United States' ongoing military presence and
activities make it the "de facto ruler of Iraq"); Jordan J. Paust, The U.S. as Occupying Power Over
Portions of Iraq and Relevant Responsibilities Under the Laws of War, ASIL INSIGHTS, 1 (April
2003).
90.
The conditions in Iraq require articles to be imported because, prior to the invasion, food
and medical goods were available mainly under the UN's oil-for-food program, see Waiting, with
Bravado and Anxiety, EcoNOMIST, Oct. 17, 2002, at 4 1 , which was halted when the invasion began.
Press Release, United Nations, United Nations Oil-For-Food Programme to end on 21 November;
Coalition Provisional Authority to Take Responsibility, U.N. Doc. IK 404 (Nov. 1 9 , 2003).
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92
security."91 Article 142 allows Parties to limit activities of relief societies
93
"essential to their security" only if the restriction does not "hinder the sup
ply of effective and adequate relief to all protected persons."94 These specific
and narrow restrictions are not equivalent to the intent or the apparent effect
of IEEPA, which allows restrictions and prohibitions for additional reasons
and for unlimited periods of time.95
IEEPA's text, unlike the articles of the Conventions, does not provide a
sufficiently specific description of the situations in which the President can
bar donations.96 Although the United States relies heavily on humanitarian
organizations during both war and peacetime, when the United States is a
party to a conflict, the President is increasingly likely to find that conditions
exist that justify exercise of the override authority. 97 While it is undisputed
that the President should have the power to prevent funds from being sent or
98
diverted to terrorists, IEEPA casts its net too broadly.
91.

Fourth Convention, supra note I, art. 63.

Relief societies, like impartial humanitarian organizations, are not defined in the Conven
92.
tions; regardless of whether the two are deemed to be equivalent, Article 142 refers to "relief
societies, or any other organizations assisting the protected persons." Fourth Convention, supra note
I, art. 142.
93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95.

50 U.S.C. § 1 702(b)(2) does not place any temporal boundaries on the President's invo

cation of the override authority, except to the extent Congress may terminate the national emergency
under 50 U.S.C. § 1 622 and subject to specification in such termination that the Presidential authori
ties in 50 U.S.C. § 1 702 are to be discontinued. See 50 U.S.C. § 1 706(b); see also Exec. Order No.
1 3,224, 3 C.F.R. § 786 (200 1 ), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1 70 1 (West 2005) (including
an effective date and no termination date).
96.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1 702(b)(2)(A) ("would seriously impair his ability to deal with any
national emergency" (emphasis added)); 50 U.S.C. § 1 702(b)(2)(C) ("in a situation where imminent
involvement is clearly indicated" (emphasis added)).
97.
50 U.S.C. § 1 702(b)(2)(A)-(C) (the override authority can be invoked when the President
determines donations would impair his ability to deal with a national emergency, are in response to
coercion, or would endanger Armed Forces of the United States). Terrorism and United States in
volvement in armed conflict are increasingly intertwined, resulting in declarations of national
emergency under 50 U.S.C. § 1 70 1 that in tum create a greater likelihood of exercise of the override
authority. President G.W. Bush has invoked the override authority numerous times during his presi
dency. See supra note 40; see also Islamic American Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents et
al., 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40, 46-47 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (mem.) (stating that the President can use the
override authority to prohibit donations where the evidence shows that an organization has provided
support of acts of terrorism); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Indictments Allege Illegal Finan
cial Transfers to Iraq: Visa Fraud Involving Assistance to Groups that Advocate Violence (Feb. 26,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/February/03_crm_ l 1 9.htm (quoting John
Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of the United States) ("As President Bush leads an international coalition to
end Saddam Hussein's tyranny and support for terror, the Justice Department will see that individu
als within our borders cannot undermine these efforts. Those who covertly seek to channel money
into Iraq under the guise of charitable work will be caught and prosecuted.").
98.
Three other legal mechanisms create a viable bulwark against terrorist financing: the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1 999, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 1 06-49 (2000), 39 l.L.M. 270, Resolution 1 373 of the United Nations Security
Council, S.C. Res. 1 373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 373 (Sept. 28, 2001 ), and the Antiterrorism and Effec
tive Death Penalty Act of 1 996, Pub. L. No. 1 04- 1 32, 1 1 0 Stat. 1 2 1 4 ( 1 996), codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000) and 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 89 (2000). Each of these makes it an
offense to transfer property with either the intent or the knowledge that the property is directed
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Executive Order 13,224, for example, allows the prohibition of humani
tarian relief by and to many persons who are unconnected to terrorist
99
activities. A significant percentage of impartial humanitarian organizations
operating in, or likely to operate in, theaters of war are subject to United
States jurisdiction. I()() Limiting or prohibiting access of impartial humanitar
ian organizations subject to U.S. jurisdiction by use of the override authority
would leave only those organizations without U.S. connections free to pro
0
vide aid. 1 1 In large conflicts and in locations where local and smaller
humanitarian organizations are unequipped or otherwise insufficient, this
would result in insufficient aid and a consequent breach of the United
02
States' Convention obligations. 1 IEEPA appears to allow the President to
operate in a realm outside of both the United States' stated commitment to
03
adhere to the obligations imposed by the Conventions 1 and the flexibility
toward actual or intended terrorist activity. None of these has the breadth to encompass impartial
humanitarian organizations:
AEDPA does not grant the Secretary unfettered discretion in designating the groups to which
giving material support is prohibited. The statute authorizes the Secretary to designate only
those groups that engage in terrorist activities. This standard is not so vague or indeterminate
as to give the Secretary unfettered discretion. For example, the Secretary could not, under this
standard, designate the International Red Cross or the International Olympic Committee as ter
rorist orgartizations. Rather, the Secretary must have reasonable grounds to believe that an
organization has engaged in terrorist acts-assassinations, bombings, hostage-taking and the
like-before she can place it on the list. (emphasis added).
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1 1 30, 1 1 37 (9th Cir. 2000).
99.

See Himamauli Das, United States Sanctions Response to the Attacks of September 1 1 ,

2001: A Synopsis of Remarks a t the NESL Rogue Regimes Conference, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 943
(2002):
[Executive Order 1 3,224] may further be used to target other entities or individuals that are
acting for or on behalf of, or are owned or controlled by, persons designated in or pursuant to
the Order; that assist in or provide support or financial or other services to those entities and
individuals designated in or under the Order; or are associated with certain categories of enti
ties and individuals designated in or under the Order, as determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. This may in
clude non-governmental or charitable organizations, as well as financial institutions in third
countries that provide financial or other services to or for persons designated in or pursuant to
the Order.
1 00.

For example, CARE, OXFAM and Medecins Sans Frontieres are all incorporated in the

United States and each is subject to U.S. jurisdiction. See supra note 2 1 .
101.
5 0 U.S.C. § l 702(b)(2) (the override authority applies to "persons subject to the jurisdic
tion of the United States").
102.
Most large humanitarian organizations fall under U.S. j urisdiction, supra note 1 00, and
without their involvement, aid to Iraq would be severely lacking. See David Finkel, Aid Efforts for
Iraqis Stalled at Border: Bush Promises Assistance Soon, WASH. PosT, March 23, 2003, at A l 5
(noting that many humanitarian organizations were waiting i n Kuwait during the United States'
attacks because the situation in Iraq was too dangerous). The United States, as an Occupying Power,
supra note 89, would therefore not be satisfying the requirements of the Conventions. See supra
note 1 4.
10 3 .

Letter o f Submittal from the Department of State, incorporated in the Message from the

President of the United States Transmitting The Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
August 1 2, 1 949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts,
Concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1 977, 26 l.L.M. 56 1 , 567 ( 1 987) [hereinafter Department of State

Protocol II Letter) (stating that "for its part, the United States would expect that the requirement of
consent by the party concerned would not be implemented in an arbitrary manner, and that essential
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demanded by the international community's interpretation of the Conven
tions' text. Limiting impartial humanitarian organizations in such a manner
is not permitted under international law.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF

IEEPA's

OVERRIDE AUTHORITY

An exercise of the IEEPA override authority could result in serious do
mestic and international legal repercussions because of the Conventions'
unique status as non-derogable, multilateral law created to protect individu
als. Section II.A argues that an analysis under Charming Betsy does not
conclude that IEEPA can coexist with the Conventions, and that additional
analysis applying the later-in-time rule is necessary. Section 11.B argues that
once the Executive demonstrates a conflict between the Conventions and
IEEPA, the nature of the Conventions demands particular adherence, and
therefore, that the customary view that the later-in-time rule allows domestic
derogation of international law does not apply. Section 11.C argues that the
international legal obligations established by · the Conventions exist regard
less of the treaty's status under domestic law. Section 11.C also argues that
because the United States' duties under the Conventions cannot be fulfilled
solely on the international plane, domestic prohibitions under IEEPA result
in a violation of the Conventions. Section 11.D provides a summary of policy
issues that arise when a party to an armed conflict limits the role of impar
tial humanitarian organizations and argues that these policy considerations
also compel observance of the Conventions.
A. Application of the Charming Betsy

Canon

104
For over 200 years, as dictated by the Charming Betsy canon, U.S.
courts have construed acts of Congress as consistent with international law
unless such a construction is impossible. 105 The Supreme Court has ruled
that even if Congress provides no direction in the text of a statute with re
spect to the dictates of a treaty, the presumption is that the two should be
106
read to coexist. The purpose of the canon is to respect principles of com-

relief shipments would only be restricted or denied for the most compelling and legitimate reasons."
The letter also discusses Protocol II, which the State Department described in the same document as
"designed to expand and refine the basic humanitarian provisions contained in [Common) Article 3
. . ." Id. at 563. The rights allocated to impartial humanitarian organizations under Article 1 8 of
Protocol II do not deviate from Common Article 3 and Common Article 9/10. Protocol Additional
(II) to the Geneva Conventions of 1 2 Aug., 1 949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non
Intemational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (June 8, 1 977), 26 l.L.M. 561 , 1 1 25 U.N.T.S. 609. De
partment of State Protocol II Letter, supra, at 567.
104.
Murray v. The Channing Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 1 1 8 ( 1 804) ("[A]n act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . ).
"

105.

See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 8 1 5 ( 1 993) (Scalia, J., dissenting);

Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 ( 1 982); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 5 7 1 ( 1 953); The Charm
ing Betsy, 6 U.S. at 1 1 8.
106.
See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 29 1 ( 1 98 1 ) ("[C]ongressional silence is not to be
equated with congressional disapproval.").
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107
108
ity and to allow a balancing of interests. Where Congress specifically
identifies a need to position United States' interests above those of a treaty
partner or the international community as a whole, a clear statement elimi
nates the need to read consistency into the two laws. '09
Although IEEPA's text does not indicate an explicit intent to overrule the
Conventions and the override authority is facially ambiguous with regard to
the role of impartial humanitarian organizations, Charming Betsy analysis
could conclude that the two laws can coexist. "0 Despite IEEPA's apparent
breadth, applying Charming Betsy in this situation of facial ambiguity limits
IEEPA's restrictions and prohibitions to the narrower restrictions permitted
by the Conventions. " ' Applying Charming Betsy, IEEPA must be read to
prohibit and restrict transactions, including donations of humanitarian
goods, only to the extent such limitations have no impact on the ongoing
obligations the United States undertook upon ratification and implementa
1 12
tion of the Conventions. Humanitarian organizations therefore must have
the level of access and the ability to provide aid dictated by the Conventions,
without any additional constraints. Prohibitions on aid directed toward Iraq
or Afghanistan, for example, would be limited to prohibitions equivalent to
the limitations permitted under the relevant articles of the Conventions.
On the assumption that Congress intended the override authority and the
Conventions to coexist, a Presidential determination that contradicted the
Conventions would violate international law and would conflict with the
1 13
implementation of the Conventions on the domestic plane. In line with
Charming Betsy, the Executive could not impose blanket prohibitions on
delivery of aid without first ascertaining whether, for example, each affected
organization was outside of the definition of impartial, and was acting in
such a way that the prohibition did not "hinder the supply of effective and
1 14
adequate relief to all protected persons."
Charming Betsy therefore

107. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. , 509 U.S. at 8 17 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that comity in
this context relates to the "respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their
laws"); see also Beharry v. Reno, 1 83 F. Supp. 2d 584, 599 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
108. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. , 509 U.S. at 8 1 5 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "interact
ing interests" of the U.S. and other nations are controlling in attempts to reconcile domestic and
international law).
109.

See Beharry, 1 83 F. Supp. 2d at 599.

1 1 0.

See Agee, 453 U.S. at 29 1 .

1 1 1.

See Fourth Convention, supra note 1 , arts. 23, 55, 59, 63 and 142.

1 1 2.

See Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, Repon of the Comm. on For.
Rel. on Executives D, E, F and G, 82d Cong., Executive Report No. 9, 32 (June 27, 1955) (urging

the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the Conventions, noting that the Conven
tions were "a landmark in the struggle to obtain . . . a humane treatment in accordance with the most
approved international usage").
1 1 3. An example of such a Presidential determination would be an inclusion of an impartial
humanitarian organization within the sweeping language of Executive Order 1 3,224.
1 1 4.

Fourth Convention, supra note 1, art. 142.
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demands narrow interpretation o f a statute's text, i n order to allow i t t o co
5

exist with international law.1 1

If IEEPA cannot be construed so as to avoid conflict with the Conven

tions, Charming Betsy cannot resolve the question of whether the statute
6
violates the treaty.1 1 The courts must look to other facts in order to deter

mine which of the two constitutes the applicable law. When a statute is

facially ambiguous and a conflict is not immediately apparent, courts will

look at legislative history, the degree of discretion given to the Executive

and the circumstances of Congressional silence in order to determine
1
whether a conflict exists.1 7 In particular, IEEPA's delegation of discretion to

the President may result in a different analysis than would be applied to a

statute that relates to other aspects of domestic law because of its connection
with situations of armed conflict and national security.118
In order to invoke the override authority and unconditionally restrict or

prohibit humanitarian action, the President must argue that IEEPA and the
Conventions do conflict and that Charming Betsy does not require adher
ence to the Conventions. There is a basis for this argument, particularly

where discretion has been afforded to the Executive. l l 9 The legislative his
tory of IEEPA indicates a strong intent to create significant authority in the

President to regulate movement of money and goods during situations of
2
national emergency.1 0 The statute does not specify narrow situations in

which the restrictions and prohibitions apply, allowing all other transactions
2
to occur unimpeded, but instead permits the reverse.1 1 Despite a lack of spe

cific reference to the provisions of the Conventions, IEEPA appears to have

1 15. Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1 1 45, 1 1 52 (7th Cir. 2001 ) (noting
that Charming Betsy "has traditionally justified a narrow interpretation of ambiguous legislation to
avoid violations of international law").
1 1 6.

Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 1 1 8 ( 1 804).

1 1 7. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 ( 1 98 1 ); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1 45355 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 986), cen. denied, 469 U.S. 889 (1 986).
1 1 8. See Agee, 453 U.S. at 291 ("[l]n the areas of foreign policy and national security . . .
congressional silence is not to be equated with congressional disapproval"). This is not to say that
the judicial analysis stops; these situations of Presidential discretion resemble political questions,
but remain in the realm of the courts. Agee was not decided as a political question case; the Court
analyzed the authority of the President, acting through the Secretary of State, on the basis of the
statute and its legislative history. See id. at 289 ("The principal question before us is whether the
statute authorizes the action of the Secretary . . ."); see also Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1455 (noting
the relevance of executive acts and judicial decision where legislation does not clearly create a con
flict between domestic and international law).
1 1 9. See Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1455 (in which the court determined that an Executive act
was "sufficient basis for . . . finding that international law does not control").
120. See S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 5 ( 1 977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4540, 4544. The
President may exercise the general authority of IEEPA, without a specific determination, in connec
tion with all transfers except for those that "subvert, contravene, or preclude effective exercise of
emergency authority." Id.
1 2 1 . The breadth of the statute reflects the committee hearings on the bill. See id. (including
discussion of narrow exceptions to the transactions that can be restricted or prohibited, and noting
that the exception for donations of humanitarian goods was narrowed to cover only those from U.S.
persons and to omit donations from foreign individuals "because the free exercise of conscience
cannot usually be presumed" for the latter).
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been drafted with the intent of breadth. This level of Congressional intent
alone might not be found to be a sufficiently "clear statement from Con
2
1 22
gress" to override, but when combined with other arguments, 1 3 may
provide the President with the ability to circumvent Channing Betsy.
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals have re
124
cently construed the Channing Betsy canon narrowly. The Seventh Circuit
determined in Sampson v. Federal Republic of Gennany 125 that it did not
need to read the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act consistently with cus
126
tomary international law and jus cogens norms. In United States v. Suerte
the Fifth Circuit stated that Congress is not obliged to legislate in confor
mity with international law, from which it could be argued that
Congressional intent need not always be emphatic in order to establish a
conflict, and therefore a need for analysis beyond Charming Betsy. In order
to maintain the flexibility that IEEPA's language, standing on its own, con
veys, the President can argue that there exists a trend, as shown by the
121
Circuit Court decisions as well as by reference to Haig v. Agee and other
28
1
Supreme Court discussion of the canon, toward a narrow reading of
Channing Betsy.

Finally, the George W. Bush administration has shown an inclination to
implicitly read Channing Betsy narrowly, and to justify broad Executive
powers as dictated by the necessities of the "war on terror." This can be
viewed as a broad interpretation of the balancing of interests analysis set
130
129
forth in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. and Beharry. This inclination is
evidenced in the Office of Legal Counsel's interpretations of the Geneva
Conventions' application to current conflicts and participants thereto. 131
1 22.

Beharry v. Reno, 1 83 F. Supp. 2d 584, 599 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).

123.

See supra text accompanying notes 1 17 through 1 19.

1 24. See United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2002); Sampson v. Fed. Republic of
Germany, 250 F.3d 1 145 (7th Cir. 2001).
1 25 . Sampson, 250 F.3d at 1 1 5 1-53 (discussing the inapplicability of Charming Betsy to
questions of sovereign immunity with respect to reparations in connection with the Nazi concentra
tion camps, where only customary international law covered the issue).
1 26. Suerte, 29 1 F.3d at 374 (stating that Charming Betsy "is not, as is sometimes implied,
any impairment of our own sovereignty, or limitation of the power of Congress") (quoting Lauritzen
v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 ( 1 953)).
1 27.
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 29 1 ( 1 98 1 ) (holding that the President has authority to re
voke U.S. passports for reasons of foreign affairs and national security, despite Congressional
silence with respect to the President's discretion).
1 28. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 8 1 5 ( 1 993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that principles of comity do not preclude U.S. courts from exercising jurisdiction over
foreign insurers in claims made under the Sherman Act).
1 29.

509 U.S. 764 (1 993).

130. Beharry, 1 83 F. Supp. 2d at 599 (holding that the Immigration and Naturalization Act
must be read in compliance with international law).
1 3 1 . See Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism:
Assessment
of Legal,
Historical,
Policy,
and
Operational
Consideration
(2003),

http://www.ccr.ny.org/v2/reports/docs/PentagonReportMarch.pdf. Although, in 2004, the Office of
Legal Counsel withdrew a related 2002 memorandum from former Assistant Attorney General Jay
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The combination of the discretion afforded the Executive in IEEPA gen
erally, and specifically within the override authority section, as well as the
weight given to issues of national security creates an argument for the Presi
dent to show the existence of a conflict between the Conventions and
132
IEEPA. If a conflict exists, Charming Betsy does not apply and it is neces
sary to determine which of the conflicting laws applies. Since Charming
Betsy is not going to end the discussion, it is necessary to further analyze the
legality of acts permitted under the override authority.
B. Domestic Legal Implications of a Violation of the
Geneva Conventions

The later-in-time doctrine is the customary method of analyzing con
flicting laws, but is not clearly applicable to conflicts involving
humanitarian law. The later-in-time doctrine provides that, in domestic law,
a later statute takes precedence over an earlier conflicting international
agreement. 133 The doctrine does not affect obligations on the international

Bybee as having an excessively narrow interpretation of international and domestic prohibitions on
torture, Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for James B. Corney Deputy
Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (December 30,
2004), the media have reported that the Justice Department concurrently advised that torture could
be used to obtain statements. See Carol D. Leonnig & Julie Tate, Detainee Hearings Bring New
Details and Disputes, WASH. PosT, Dec. 1 1 , 2004, at A l . The George W. Bush administration also
denied application of the Conventions in connection with prisoners' rights. See U.S. Action Bars
Right of Some Captured in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES at A l , A l 2 (Oct. 26, 2004) (reporting that a March 2004
memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel concluded that some non-Iraqi persons captured by
the U.S. military in Iraq, like members of Al Qaeda, were not entitled to the protections of the Con
ventions). This stance was rejected by the District Court for the District of Columbia in November,
2004. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), rev 'd, 4 1 5 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir.
2005), rev 'd and remanded, 2006 WL 1 764793 (U.S. June 29, 2006).
1 32. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. , 509 U.S. at 8 1 5 ; Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64,
1 18 ( 1 804); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1 446, 1455 ( I Ith Cir. 1 986), cen. denied, 469 U.S. 889
( 1 986).
1 33. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 1 90 ( 1 888) (holding that a general application im
port statute passed after an import treaty was signed between the United States and the Dominican
Republic, controls); see also The Chinese Exclusion Case, 1 30 U.S. 58 1 , 600 ( 1 889); United States
v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1 89, 2 1 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("It is well-established that Congress has the
power to override international law."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ l 1 5 ( 1 )(a) ( 1 987) ("An Act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provi
sion of an international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede
the earlier rule or provision is clear and if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly
reconciled"). A strong view of the doctrine is that the original intent of the Framers and current law
unequivocally support not only the doctrine but consequently-diminished obligations on all planes.
Senator Jesse Helms, in comments made regarding the United States' payment obligations to the
United Nations, expressed this view: "Treaty obligations can be superseded by a simple act of Con
gress. This was the intentional design of our founding fathers, who cautioned against entering into
entangling alliances. Now then, when the United States joins a treaty organization, the organization
holds no legal authority over us." See U.S Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) Delivers Remarks to the UN
Security Council, 2000 WL 422 1 2 (Jan. 20, 2000). Senator Helms's view caused considerable inter
national consternation. See, e.g. , U. S. Senator Berates UN (January 2 1 , 2000) , http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/americas/6 1 2594.stm (noting negative reaction of members of the Security Council,
including [the Russian representative] Sergey Layrov: "All the other members of the United Nations
expected the United States to keep its word").
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134
plane. In other words, if Congress enacts legislation that is inconsistent
with a treaty obligation, the domestic effect of the treaty is eliminated but
the United States' obligations under international law, and the implications
of such obligations, continue. The later-in-time doctrine is established under
U.S. law with respect to bilateral treaties and to multilateral agreements that
.
135
cover contractual obl.1gattons.
No case has yet raised the specific question of whether later domestic
law categorically overrides a multilateral humanitarian or human rights
treaty. 136 Congress enacted IEEPA after ratifying the Conventions, and, ap
plying the established rule of later-in-time, the former overrides the latter to
the extent domestic law relates to the United States' treaty obligations. 137
138
Growing debate over the universality of the later-in-time doctrine, com
bined with the special nature of certain multilateral treaties, demands more
thorough consideration of the override authority's effect on international
obligations before applying the doctrine to the IEEPA-Conventions conflict.
The later-in-time doctrine originated in a dispute over bilateral agree
ments related to import duties, 139 unconnected to humanitarian or human
rights issues. The Supreme Court held in Whitney v. Robertson: 140
1 34. There is a plethora of support for continuing at least those obligations that exist on the
international plane. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § J 15(1 )(b) ( 1 987).
Furthermore:
Just as a statute can be superseded by a later inconsistent statute, so can a treaty be superseded,
although maxims of interpretation [e.g. Charming Betsy] encourage a judicial effort to con
strue the later-in-time statute so as not to violate the treaty. If that effort fails, the legislative
rule prevails internally, although as a matter of international law the United States has broken
its obligations to the other treaty party.
HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT

1022 (2d ed.

2000) .
1 35. See S. African Airways v. Dole, 8 1 7 F.2d 1 1 9 (D.C. Cir. 1 987) (holding that the Anti
Apartheid Act unambiguously has precedence over a bilateral agreement between the United States
and South Africa with regard to air services).
1 36. The author's exhaustive search finds no case where this argument is considered directly.
One recent case concerned the head of a U.S. charity indicted for diverting donated goods to terrorist
organizations in Bosnia and Chechnya in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, but not under IEEPA. See
United States v. Amaout, 282 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Ill . 2003). The government dismissed these
charges and prosecuted only a charge of racketeering fraud. Id. at 840. Other recent cases have consid
ered the inclusion of charitable organizations on the government's lists of terrorist organizations subject
to IEEPA. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
1 37. See Taylor v. Morton, 23 F.Cas. 784, 786 (No. 13,799) (C.C. Mass. 1855), aff'd, 67 U.S.
(2 Black) 481 ( 1 862) (distinguishing between those aspects of a treaty that relate to the people,
which can be abrogated by Congress under a later act, and those aspects that relate to the govern
ment, which create an ongoing obligation to treaty partners irrespective of Congressional acts).
1 38. See Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy
and International Law, 7 1 VA. L. REV. 107 1 , 1 15 2 ( 1 985) ("The doctrine making all international
law rules, irrespective of their content or importance, inferior to later-in-time statutes no longer
accords with contemporary international theory or practice."); see also HENKIN, supra note 30, at
485 n. 1 30 ("In other contexts [citing Reservations to the Genocide Convention and The Palestine
Liberation Organization Mission Controversy] it has been suggested that multilateral treaties are
different because they are not primarily contracts among the parties.").
1 39.

Whitney v. Robertson, 1 24 U.S. 1 90, 1 9 1 (1 888).

1 40.

Id.
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By the constitution [sic], a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made
of like obligation, with an act of legislation . . . . when the two relate to the
same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to
give effect to both . . . but, if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date
141

will control the other.

Following Whitney, the government could justify derogation from do
mestic obligations established by a treaty upon passage of a conflicting
statute. Courts have accepted Congressional derogation of treaties related to
·
142
.
sueh issues
as import
to mu1tt1atera1 trea.
.
duty and tax. 143 A s cases re1atmg
ties covering individual and human rights arose, no court ruled conclusively
that the Whitney framework for the later-in-time doctrine applied. 144 Even
where the courts supported the later-in-time rule, they gave some deference
to the international obligations remaining after the enactment of a conflict
ing statute, and to the weight of the United States' overall treaty
145
obligation. Doubt now exists over whether the later-in-time doctrine ap
plies to all cases where treaties and statutes diverge; it is therefore
imperative to question the doctrine's applicability to a conflict between the
Conventions and IEEPA. 146
A leading case addressing application of the later-in-time rule to multi
lateral treaty obligations, Diggs v. Schultz, 147 reveals issues that the courts
would balance against a propensity for rigid application of the doctrine Al
.
though the court upheld a domestic statute under the later-in-time
148
doctrine, in its analysis of the importance of the UN Charter, Diggs offers
a basis for identifying conditions under which treaty obligations continue on
the domestic plane in the face of conflicting, later, domestic law.
The Diggs court addressed a conflict between a UN Security Council reso
lution that established a trade embargo with Rhodesia ("Resolution 232"),149

141.

Id.

142. See Akins v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 748, 1 70 (Cust. Ct 1 976) (holding that customs
duty payable where existing law conflicts with earlier treaty).
143. See Kappus v. Comm'r, 337 F.3d 1053, 1 060 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that 26 U.S.C.
§ 59(a)(2) governs despite an earlier conflicting treaty between United States and Canada).
144.
( 1 973).
145.

See Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 , 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 4 1 1 U.S. 931
Id. at 46 1 .

146. See HENKIN, supra note 30, at 2 1 0- 1 1 ("Particularly as regards multilateral treaties of
general applicability which establish universal standards--on human rights . . . -inconsistent legis
lation by Congress not only violates international obligations but ruptures international consensus
which the President-and-Senate helped achieve."); see also Lobel, supra note 1 38; infra notes 2092 10.
147. Diggs, 470 F.2d 461 (holding that plaintiffs' argument that licenses permitting trade with
Southern Rhodesia, issued pursuant to the Byrd Amendment to the Strategic and Critical Materials
Stock Piling Act, violated Resolution 232 of the Security Council of the United Nations (which
resolution was passed with an affirmative vote from the United States and subsequently imple
mented on the domestic level) was a political question).
148.

Id. at 466.

149.

S.C. Res. 232, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 ( 1 966).
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and the Byrd Amendment' 50 to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock
Piling Act, 151 that denied the President the right to restrict such trade. The
Diggs court concluded that the earlier UN resolution protected against the
appellant's alleged injury, stating that for people harmed by policies that the
embargo was established to curtail, "United Nations action constitute[d] the
only hope." 152 The court noted that the dispute arose from actions "in dero
gation of the solemn treaty obligation of the United States to adhere to the
embargo for so long as it is in being." 153 The court considered United Na
tions obligations, which the United States affirmatively pledged to observe,
to be of particular significance. 154
The court then addressed the contention that the United States' commit
ment to the United Nations "has more force than an ordinary treaty" 155 in its
discussion of the later-in-time rule. The court replied in the negative to the
"all or nothing" argument that it would be necessary to fully withdraw from
the United Nations in order to override Resolution 232 but did not deny the
156
assertion that treaties may be differently weighted. As a result of Diggs,
the United States Ambassador to the United Nations testified to Congress on
the difficulty of persuading others to live up to their legal obligations after
the United States' violation of the Rhodesian boycott. 157 While these results
are not complete confirmation that the doctrine is incompatible with multi
lateral treaties on individual and human rights, the court did suggest some of
1 50.

3 1 C.F.R. § 530 (1972) (removed, 57 Fed. Reg. 1 386 (Jan. 14, 1 992)).

151.

50 u.s.c. § 98 (2000) .

1 52. Diggs, 470 F.2d at 465. The court went on to say that the appellants "are personally
aggrieved and injured by the dereliction of any member state which weakens the capacity of the
world organization to make its policies meaningful." Id. Diggs was cited negatively in Dellums v.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm 'n, 863 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The complaint with Diggs does
not, however, reject the court's acceptance of the treaty's import, see id. at 983 n.4 (Ginsburg, J.
dissenting) ("Because Diggs retains vitality as a binding decision, it should guide this panel until
overturned by the court en bane."), but rather the question of causal nexus. Id. at 976.
1 53. Diggs, 470 F.2d at 465 (noting that the appellants' primary complaint was against the
government of Rhodesia).
154.
Id. at 465 ("Appellees suggest that the prospects of significant relief by means of the
embargo are so slight that this relationship of intended benefit is too tenuous to support standing.
But this strikes us as tantamount to saying that because the performance of the United Nations is not
always equal to its promise, the commitments of a member may be disregarded without having to
respond in a court to a charge of treaty violation."). The court held for the plaintiffs on the issue of
standing, and it is therefore appropriate to rely on the court's reasoning regarding the United Na
tions. Id.
1 55.

Id.

1 56. Id. (noting that, despite the fact that the sanctions imposed by the U.N. would not neces
sarily provide a benefit to the appellants, "dereliction of any member state which weakens the
capacity of the world organization to make its policies meaningful" created the injury).
1 57.
To Amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1 945 to Halt the Importation of Rho
desian Chrome and to Restore the U.S. to its Position as a Law Abiding Member of the International
Community: Hearing on S. 1 868 Before the S. Subcomm. on African Affairs, Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 93d Cong. 'II 1 5 ( 1 973) (statement of John Scali, United States Ambassador to the United

Nations) (noting that Congressional derogation of international obligations would make it both more
difficult for the United States to convince other nations to comply with international law, and more
likely that other nations would question the dependability of the United States and the strength of
the Security Council in general).

2044

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:201 9

the anomalies between the doctrine and international law obligations. The
opinion reflects an apparent bias toward the United Nations as a unique
158
mechanism supporting individual rights.
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Beharry v.
159
Reno
commented on a practical problem with applying the later-in-time
doctrine in this context by noting judicial unease with perfunctory override
of human rights treaties:
Once this country says there is a U.N. Charter, there are U.N. covenants,
there are treaties, and we subscribe to them . . . there are going to be civil
and perhaps criminal consequences that we might not all think are so won
derful. But you can't simply say that we're going to have treaties for the
160
rest of them but, of course, they won't apply to us.

There is a basis for limiting the later-in-time rule and its effect on a mul
161
tilateral human rights treaty. The nature of the multilateral contract and the
objectives set forth therein are relevant to determining the stringency with
162
which the doctrine applies, particularly where the subject is human rights.
Categorical acceptance of the later-in-time doctrine is thus eroded in certain
circumstances. The Conventions, like the UN Charter, are of a different na
ture from a standard bilateral treaty and fall into a category of international
163
agreements that compels special adherence.
United States courts have consistently emphasized the critical nature of
the Conventions. 164 The United States District Court for the Southern Dis
trict of Florida discussed the obligations of the Third Convention in some
1 58 . Diggs, 470 F.2d at 465 ("the United Nations constitutes the [appellants'] only hope"); id.
at 466 ("the purpose and effect of the Byrd Amendment. . . . was to detach this country from the
U.N. boycott of Southern Rhodesia in blatant disregard of our treaty undertakings").
1 59.

1 83 F. Supp. 2d 584, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).

1 60. Id. at 601 (citing Statement of Jon 0. Newman, 1 70 F.R.D. 201 , 3 1 7- 1 8 (1996) (Judicial
Conference of the Second Circuit)).
1 6 1 . See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 1 1 5 cmt. 2 ( 1 987) ("[l]t has
been urged that the doctrine should not apply to inconsistency between a statute and general interna
tional law established by multilateral treaty.").
162. See Lobel, supra note 138, at 1 074 ("A complete deference by United States courts to
executive orders or congressional acts irrespective of international law implications would be simply
inconsistent with the spirit and rationale of Nuremberg.").
163.
There is an argument that international humanitarian law is close to jus cogens, and
therefore not only different in character from bilateral and non-human rights related multilateral
treaties but in fact nonderogable. Nonderogable rights are those that cannot be infringed on even
during a state of emergency, war or other crisis. BoucHET-SAULNIER, supra note 8, at 108.
1 64. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisenstrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n. 1 4 ( 1 950) (noting the United
States' obligations under the Conventions); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1097-98 (D.C.
Cir. 199 1 ) (noting the United States' status as a signatory to the Conventions and agreeing with the
District Court's use of the Convention's language in its analysis); Coal. of Clergy v. Bush, 1 89 F.
Supp. 2d 1 036, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (referring to the United States' agreement to be bound to
certain treatment of prisoners under the Convention and noting its application to some of the detain
ees held at Guantanamo Bay following the United States' military action in Afghanistan); United
States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 79 1 , 795 (S.D. Fla. 1 992) (analyzing prisoner of war status under the
Third Convention). The George W. B ush administration has shown an inclination toward increas
ingly selective application of the Conventions. See supra note 1 3 1 . As of the date of this writing,
courts have not addressed the statements and opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel.
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165

detail in United States v. Noriega. The Noriega court emphasized "the
United States' asserted commitment to . . . promoting respect for the laws of
166
armed conflict through liberal interpretation of the Geneva Conventions."
The court strongly endorsed the United States' compliance with the Conven
168
167
tions, noting both their wide scope and importance.
Consistent with the courts' indications that multilateral human rights
treaties merit different analysis, the common scholarly view acknowledges
the later-in-time doctrine as good law but emphasizes the continuing nature
169
of international obligations. The resulting separation of a single treaty into
its domestic and international components establishes that although treaties
110
171
and statutes are constitutional equals, they are not identical. This distinc
tion stem� from what is often considered to be the original intention of the
Framers, to uphold treaty obligations or to rectify a breach. 172 The evolution
173
of the later-in-time rule is a partial repudiation of this intention but some
of the Framers' aims survive. That application of the rule does not diminish
obligations toward treaty partners is not just a consequence of limited Con
174
gressional powers; it is also a result of the contractual relationship among
165. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 803 (holding that incarceration in federal penitentiary was not a
violation of the Conventions as long as treatment provided the rights allocated by the Third Conven
tion).
166.

Id. at 80 I.
See id. at 803 (" Considerable space has been taken to set forth conclusions which could

1 67.
have been stated in one or two pages.That is because of the potential importance of the question to
so many.... ); id at 795 (''The United States is a firm supporter of the four Geneva Conventions of
1 949 .... As a nation, we have a strong desire to promote respect for the laws of armed conflict. ... " (citing Letter from the State Dept. to the Attorney General of the United States (Jan. 3 1 ,
1 990))).
"

168.

See id. at 803.

169. See HENKIN, supra note 30, at 209 ("Acts of Congress inconsistent with earlier treaty
obligations have been given effect by the courts.... Such legislation does not affect the validity of
the treaty and its continuing international obligations for the United States, but it compels the United
States to be in default."); Detlev Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, Editorial Comment, 92 AM.
J. INT'L L. 458, 460 (1998) ("the later-in-time rule is not the end of the matter, since an obligation to
other countries continues to exist independently of the treaty's status in American law ").
170.

See Head Money Cases, 1 1 2 U.S. 580, 598 ( 1 884).

1 7 1 . See id. a t 599 ("[A]n act o f Congress . .. which may be repealed or modified b y a n act of
a later date ").
172.
Numerous authorities support the contention that equality of treaties and statutes was not
clearly specified in the drafting of the Constitution. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 30, at 2 1 0 ("As an
original matter, the equality in U.S. law of treaties and federal statutes seems hardly inevitable;
surely, the Supremacy Clause which the Supreme Court invoked does not establish it."); Detlev F.
Vagts, The United States and its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM.J. INT'L L. 3 1 3, 3 1 3-14
(200 1 ) [hereinafter Vagts, Observance and Breach] ("In the past, the courts and the political
branches consistently acknowledged ...if the United States breaches [a treaty], it has an obligation
to set the matter straight....There is good reason to believe that the [later-in-time] rule would not
have commended itself to the founders' generation ").
1 73.
Vagts, Observance and Breach, supra note 172, at 3 1 3 (noting that the three branches of
the federal government have "conspicuously verbalized the idea that .. .the binding effect of inter
national law carries little weight, " thus supporting the later-in-time rule as absolute).
1 74.
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 ( 1 979) (dismissing the question of whether the Presi
dent can unilaterally rescind a treaty as nonjusticiable, with the effect that it is the President who has
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the treaty parties 175 and, in certain situations, of the significance and impor
176
tance of the issue addressed.
Current judicial and scholarly views on the strength and scope of the
later-in-time doctrine are not uniform, and it may be assailable in the con
177
text of the Conventions. Although IEEPA will control under a strict
178
reading of the doctrine, the United States' domestic obligations under the
Conventions, including the duty to permit access by impartial humanitarian
organizations, will survive because of the nature of multilateral treaties em
bodying humanitarian obligations.
C.

International Legal Implications of a Violation
of the Geneva Conventions

Convention obligations that do not impinge on activities subject to do
mestic adjudication are unaffected by application of the later-in-time rule
179
because they are distinct from domestic implementation of the treaty. The
United States must be able to perform these obligations in full in order to
avoid sanctions or legal action. 18° Conflicting domestic law does not diminthe ability to do so); see also HENKIN, supra note 30, at 209 (noting that passing a conflicting statute
is not a repeal of the treaty because "Congress is not acting upon the treaty but, in exercising one of
its powers, it legislates without regard to the international obligations of the United States").
1 75 . See THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 332 (John Jay) (Max Beloff ed., 1 948) ("[A] treaty is
only another name for a bargain; and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would make
any bargain with us, which should be binding on them absolutely, but on us only so long and so far
as we may think proper to be bound by it.").
1 76.

For example:

It very well may be that a statute can override a treaty, but when dealing with a fundamental
institution like the United Nations, can the United States argue that the provision of the Head
quarter.; Agreement relating to the arbitration requirement does not apply, while the United
States continues to operate under the other provisions of the agreement? When this matter is
ultimately decided by the courts, they will have to address the issue as to whether the Charter
of the United Nations and the Headquarter.; Agreement are just ordinary treaties.
Leonard B. Boundin, Remarks, The Palestine Liberation Organization Mission Controversy, 82 AM.
Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc. 534, 54 1 ( 1 988); see also Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the
United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1 569 n.44 ( 1984) ("The [later-in-time) rule may be different
in respect of . . . provisions of multilateral treaties that recognize rights for private persons, notably
human rights.").
1 77.

Paul C. Szasz, Director of the General Legal Division of the United Nations, Remarks,

The Palestine Liberation Organization Mission Controversy, 82 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc. 534, 538

( 1 988) (''The later-in-time rule depends on a series of court decisions which . . . are decisions that
bear reexamination, particularly as to their applicability to multilateral treaties such as the U.N.
Charter and to agreements made pursuant to the Charter.")
1 78 .

See Whitney v . Robertson, 1 24 U.S. 1 90, 1 94 ( 1 888).

1 79. Id. at 2 1 0; see also Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,
937 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Our conclusion, of course, speaks not at all to whether the United States has
upheld its treaty obligations under international Jaw." ). The question here is how treaty obligations
differ pre- and post-domestic implementation, rather than whether the treaty is self-executing-i.e.,
whether domestic application of treaty obligations requires Congressional action. See Foster v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 3 1 4 ( 1 829) (distinguishing non-self-executing treaties from self-executing
treaties).
1 80.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW § I J 5 ( l )(b) ( 1 987).

August 2006]

IEEPA 's Override Authority

2047

ish the validity of international treaty obligations and, therefore, IEEPA does
not change the United States' obligation to comply with the Conventions on
the international plane.181 The Conventions require affirmative actions by the
2
signatories.1 8 These actions cannot be segregated so that they occur only on
1
the international plane and they are therefore subject to domestic law. 83 A

prohibition under IEEPA on these affirmative duties to act on both the do

mestic and international planes makes performance under the Conventions
an impossibility.184

It could be argued that the Conventions create only an end-that the

specified goods must reach persons in need-and do not specify the means

by which that end must be achieved, thus allowing the type of discretion
5
delegated to the President in the override authority.18 For all their specificity

in identifying items to be provided to non-combatants, the Conventions

leave the scope of some obligations open to interpretation: for example, the

Occupying Power's obligation to provide these items when the local supply
is "inadequate."186 The absence of an absolute definition of impartiality in
the Conventions187 shows further lack of clarity. These apparent holes could

support a contention that any individual Party to a conflict is justified in its
own assessment of adequate performance under the Conventions and that, as

a consequence, performance on the international plane can be satisfied
without any domestic action.

This argument fails for two reasons: first, the parties to a conflict might
not effectively achieve even adequate performance of the required end.188

Second, as discussed above, the Conventions allocate certain rights to im
partial humanitarian organizations themselves.189 It is not, therefore, simply

181. Although the Constitutional text Jacks clarity regarding authority to terminate treaties, it
is well-established that conflicting legislation alters only the domestic effect of a treaty. See id.
("That a rule of international Jaw or a provision of an international agreement is superseded as do
mestic law does not relieve the United States of its international obligation or of the consequences
of a violation of that obligation."); HENKIN, supra note 30, at 173.
182. The Parties are obligated to comply with the Conventions. See Common Article 2, supra
note l ; Common Article 3, supra note 1 (obligating the Parties to comply with the Conventions to
ensure access by impartial humanitarian organizations); supra note 10; Fourth Convention, supra
note 1, arts. 23, 55 (obligating Parties to provide, and to provide passage of, certain goods).
183.

See supra notes 15 to 19 and accompanying text.

184. W hen the override authority is invoked, the general prohibitions and restrictions of the
statute apply, permitting, inter alia, a prohibition on donations of humanitarian articles. 50 U.S.C.
§ § 1702(a)( l)(A), 1702(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
185. See COMMENTARY I, supra note 10, at 12-13 ("A choice had to be made between elabo
rating very full and detailed rules covering all possible eventualities, or formulating general
principles sufficiently flexible to be adapted to existing circumstances"). The Commentary further
notes that the inclusion of "general and indefeasible principles" helped to achieve this flexibility. Id.
186. Fourth Convention, supra note 1, art. 55 (requiring an Occupying Power to provide
specified articles "[t]o the fullest extent of the means available to it").
187.

See supra note 51.

188.

See supra note 54.

189.

See supra note 53.
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Presidential discretion that determines what constitutes compliance with the
international obligations arising under the Conventions.
The aid obligations and impartial humanitarian organizations' right to
access contained in the Conventions argue against designating the conflict
with IEEPA a political question. Application of the political question doc
1
trine results in nonjusticiability for certain situations of foreign affairs. 90
The Supreme Court has clarified the circumstances in which the doctrine
applies, stating that it excludes from review "those controversies which re
191
volve around policy choices and value determinations . . . ." Adherence to
the Geneva Conventions, a multilateral treaty with 1 90 signatories that is so
192
widely accepted that it is considered customary international law, should
not depend on a policy choice or a value judgment of an Executive immune
from review. More recently, the District Court for the Eastern District of
3
Virginia in United States v. Lindh 1 9 discussed Presidential determinations
under the Conventions and stated that "[c]onclusive deference [to the Presi
194
dent], which amounts to judicial abstention, is plainly inappropriate."
The United States has an obligation to provide care to non-combatants
and to allow an identified group of organizations access to ensure that the
195
aid arrives. The President does not have a right under the Conventions to
determine whether the United States has such an obligation. The situations
in which both the Conventions and IEEPA apply often, if not always, coin
cide with situations in which the foreign affairs power permits the Executive
196
to make policy choices and value judgments. The conflict between the two
laws merits judicial review, which is not excused by the political question
doctrine. 197
On the international plane, the United States has an unambiguous obli
198
gation to comply with the Conventions. The International Court of Justice
190.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1 86, 2 1 1-12 ( 1 962) (listing factors to be taken into account
in determining whether an issue is a nonjusticiable political question).
1 9 1 . Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 22 1 , 230 ( 1 986) (holding that the
"political overtones" of a controversy surrounding whaling quotas did not bar judicial inquiry).
192. See supra note 1 2 ; see also BoUCHET-SAULNIER, supra note 8, at 65 (noting that all four
Conventions have the status of customary international law).
193.

2 1 2 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).

194.

Id. at 556-57.

195. Common Article 1 , supra note l ; Common Article 3, supra note l ; Common Article
9/10, supra note I .
196. Lindh, 2 1 2 F. Supp. 2 d a t 555-56 (discussing situations i n which the President, a s Com
mander in Chief, should be given deference by the judicial branch, but concluding that the
determination, in this case, relating to the applicability of the Conventions during a national emer
gency did not demand judicial abstention).
1 97. Id. at 556 ("At the highest level of abstraction, it may be argued that the Constitution
commits the conduct of foreign affairs to the President. This is hardly a clear, demonstrable constitu
tional commitment to the President to construe and apply treaties free from judicial review. Indeed,
as Baker warns, 'it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations
lies beyond judicial cognizance.' ") (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1 86, 2 1 1 ( 1 962)).
198. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 156 (D.D.C. 2004), rev 'd, 4 1 5 F.3d 33
(D.C. Cir. 2005), rev 'd and remanded, 2006 WL 1764793 (U.S. June 29, 2006) ("It is universally
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stated this very clearly in Military and Paramilitary A ctivities:199 "[T]here is
an obligation on the United States Government, in the terms of Article 1 of
the Geneva Conventions, to 'respect' the Conventions and even to 'ensure
200
respect' for them 'in all circumstances."' Subsequent cases decided by the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the International Crimi
201
nal Tribunal for Rwanda reiterated the enforceability of the Conventions.
As the United States Supreme Court has often reiterated, "[i]nternational
202
law is part of our law." In some circumstances, a conflicting domestic
statute will not inhibit the United States from performing its international
obligations under an earlier treaty and will change only the conditions under
203
which a claim can be made following a violation. In this case, interna
204
tional law remains "our law" without controversy. In other circumstances,
a bar on the domestic plane will inhibit performance on the international
plane.
An example of the latter situation arose when the 1 987 Anti-Terrorism
Ad05 mandated the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization
("PLO") UN Observer Mission.206 The convergence of the domestic statute
and international obligations under the UN Headquarters Agreement, under
which the United States gave the UN the right to invite non-members to be
present at its headquarters as observers,207 made compliance with both

agreed, and is demonstrable in the Convention language itself . .. that Common Article 3 embodies
'international human norms' "); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 'l! 218 (June 27).
199.

1986 1.C.J.14.

200.

Id. at 'l! 220.

201. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. I CTR-96-4-T, 'l! 4 ( Sept. 2, 1998) ("According to
Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute relating to its ratione materiae jurisdiction, the Tribunal has the power
to prosecute persons .. .responsible for serious violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Con
ventions of 12 August 1949 on the protection of victims of war "); Prosecutor v. Tadi , Case No. IT94-1-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 'JI 143 (Oct. 2,
1995) (concluding that the ICTY had the authority to apply the Conventions ).Although these cases
do not specifically address the obligations of the United States, they provide the basis for enforce
ability of signatories to the Conventions. See id. at 'l! 270 (July 17, 1999); see also Jan E.
Aldykiewicz & Geoffrey S. Com, Authority To Court-Martial Non-U.S. Military Personnel For
Serious Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed During Internal Armed Conflicts,

167 MIL. L. REV. 74, 127 (2001) ("The cases decided after Nicaragua establish, beyond any doubt,
that violations of Common Article 3(1) ... are serious violations of international humanitarian law
resulting in universal jurisdiction and giving rise to individual criminal responsibility ").
202. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Sosa v.Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 730 (2004) (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 700 (1900)).
203. See Lobel, supra note 138, at 1073 ("The conventional justification for according the
political branches the constitutional power to violate international law posits a dichotomy between
the national order and the international order.. ..The government is legally answerable only in the
international sphere, with enforcement left to appropriate sanctions imposed by other nations.")
(internal citations omitted).
204.

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.

205.

Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5201--03 (2000).

206.

Id. § 5202(3).

207.

22 u.s.c. § 287.
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208
impossible. The U N Headquarters Agreement required the United States
209
to extend certain privileges to observer missions. The later Anti-Terrorism
Act prohibited, inter alia, the establishment of any office with the purpose of
210
furthering the interests of the PL0. The court stated, "[w)e believe the
[Anti-Terrorism Act] and the Headquarters Agreement cannot be reconciled
except by finding the [Anti-Terrorism Act] inapplicable to the PLO Ob
212
211
server Mission." Although the court relied on the Charming Betsy canon
that statutes should be construed to comply with the law of nations if possi
ble, 213 it was a stretch to assert that the language of the ATA showed no
2 14
congressional intent to override the treaty. As the PLO case shows, even if
courts accept the later-in-time doctrine unconditionally, at times implemen
tation of the domestic law will necessarily violate the international
216
217
215
. .
obl1gat10ns
w h"1ch the law, the courts, and commentators consistently
support.
•

208.

For example:

Everyone agrees that the Anti-Terrorism Act, at least insofar as it applies to the PLO Mission
at the United Nations, is a violation of the Headquarters Agreement and, presumably, the Char
ter of the United Nations that the Agreement implements. The question that is posed in the
litigation, . . . is whether the statute has priority over the Charter? I must say that I am puzzled
by a statement . . . that the international obligations of the United States remain in effect. If
they remain in effect, it is very difficult to see how the statute can be carried out.
Boundin, supra note 1 76, at 541 .

209.

The Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States Regarding the Head

quarters of the

United

Nations,

26 June

1 944, reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 287

[hereinafter

Headquarters Agreement].

2 1 0.

22 U.S.C.A. § 5202(3) ("It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the interests of

the Palestine Liberation Organization . . . to establish or maintain an office, headquarters, premises
or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest or direc
tion of, or with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent
groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents thereof.").

211.

United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1 988).

2 1 2.

See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 1 1 8 ( 1 804); PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1465.

The Palestine Liberation court reasoned that "neither the Mission nor the Headquarters
2 1 3.
Agreement is mentioned in the [Anti-Terrorism Act] itself," PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1468. However,
the language of the Anti-Terrorism Act specifically prohibits PLO offices, supra note 2 10. The court
next reasoned that "while the section of the [Anti-Terrorism Act] prohibiting the maintenance of an
office applies 'notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary' it does not purport to apply
notwithstanding any treaty." PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1468 (internal citations omitted). The Headquar
ters Agreement, however, has been implemented into domestic law. 22 U.S.C. § 287. The PLO
court's determination that a treaty is not the law is inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions. See,

e.g., Head Money Cases, 1 1 2 U.S. 580, 598 ( 1 884) ("A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of
Congress is . . . .").

2 1 4.

See Vagts, supra note 1 69, at 1 59 (noting, apparently with some sarcasm, that "[o]nly

heroic efforts to interpret the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 so as not to evince an intent to overrule a
prior international agreement . . . prevented a statute from putting [the United States] in violation of
[its] treaty commitments").

2 1 5.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW § l J 5 ( l )(b) ( 1987).

2 1 6.
See Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 , 465 (D.C. Cir. 1 972), cen. denied, 4 1 1 U.S. 9 3 1
( 1 973); Beharry v . Reno, 1 83 F. Supp. 2 d 584, 601 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
2 1 7.

See supra note 1 8 1 .
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IEEPA and the Conventions create a problem similar to that of the PLO
mission, in that exercise of the override authority would prohibit activities
218
that the Conventions mandate. Under IEEPA the President can choose to
bar the export of items such as food and medicine by an impartial humani
2
tarian organization subject to United States jurisdiction. 1 9 The Conventions
obligate Parties to permit these same organizations access to deliver these
220
same goods. The United States cannot, therefore, comply on the interna
tional plane while prohibiting on the domestic plane the activities necessary
for compliance.
Where the domestic and international planes coincide, co-existence of
the later-in-time rule and treaty obligations creates a paradox that current
doctrine cannot always resolve. In this case, it is not possible to read consis
221
tency into the statute in adherence to the Charming Betsy canon. Although
impartial humanitarian organizations, and more generally, supporters of the
Conventions, would argue that Charming Betsy dictates that courts must
carve the Conventions' aid obligations and rights of access out of Executive
Orders pursuant to the override authority, there is no statutory text in IEEPA
to interpret in connection with the Conventions' specific references to im
222
partial humanitarian organizations.
In order to accede to this request,
22
courts must read limitations into the text of IEEPA, 3 which requires a level
of judicial activism beyond that which the courts have considered Charming
224
Betsy to permit.
Once the existence of a conflict has been established,
225
courts will apply the later-in-time doctrine, but where, as here, the prohib
ited and required acts are one and the same, the later-in-time analysis does
not provide resolution. For IEEPA and the Conventions to coexist with re
spect to impartial humanitarian organizations and their activities during
armed conflict, courts must relax the later-in-time doctrine.

2 1 8. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2); Common Article 3, supra note l ; Common Article 9/10,
supra note 1 .
2 1 9.

50 u.s.c. § 1 702(b)(2).

220. See, e.g., Third Convention, supra note 1,
23, 55, 59.

art.

73; Fourth Convention, supra note 1,

art.

22 1 . See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 1 1 7-1 8 ( 1 804); see also Richard A. Falk,
Remarks, Palestine Liberation Organization Controversy, 82 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PRoc. 534, 546
( 1 988) ("This set of controversies that has exposed our country externally to such an awkward set of
contradictory commitments provides us with the challenge and opportunity to rethink the place of
international law in our constitutional process and, in the broader sense, of relating it in a more
systematic and effective way to the conduct of foreign relations.").
222.

See Joan Fitzpatrick & William Bennett, A Lion in the Path ? The Influence of Interna

tional Law on the Immigration Policy of the United States, 70 WASH. L. REV. 589, 593-94 (1995)

(noting that when U.S. political branches violate treaties "they must act unambiguously . . . Breach
of treaty or customary law should not be permitted to occur by implication"); see also text accom
panying notes 1 12 to 1 17.
223.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2) (creating the override authority).

224.

See Ralph Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory

Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1 103, 1 167 (1990).

225.

See supra note 1 28.
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Policy Implications of a Violation of the Conventions

International agreements, especially those related to humanitarian law
226
and human rights, by their nature raise issues of foreign policy. While
courts at times dismiss claims as political questions addressable only by the
227
legislature and the executive, such dismissal is not a foregone conclu
228
sion. Whether or not the Conventions are of such a nature as to preclude
automatic application of the later-in-time rule, 229 and whether or not adher
ence on the international plane is made impossible by the domestic
230
legislation, policy grounds tip the balance and require that courts find that
the later-in-time doctrine does not apply to multilateral humanitarian treaties.
International law depends a great deal on nations' assessments of their
231
own needs for reciprocity and credibility on the international plane. Do
mestic self-interest is also a significant consideration, but it is often bounded
by the more complex considerations of reciprocity and credibility to balance
short-term and long-term costs and benefits of compliance. 232

226.

The policy considerations relate to the United States' interests in the international and

domestic arenas and to the practical implications of limiting and politicizing humanitarian aid. See
Chew Hong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 539-40 (1884) (" 'There would no longer be any secu
rity,' says Vattel, 'no longer any commerce between mankind, if [nations] did not

think themselves

obliged to keep faith with each other, and to perform their promises.'" "[T]he court cannot be un
mindful of the fact, that the honor of the government and people of the United States is involved in
every inquiry whether rights secured by such [treaty] stipulations shall be recognized and pro
tected.
").
227.

See Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931

(1973) ("The considerations underlying [the passage of the B y rd Amendment] by Congress present
issues of political policy which courts do not inquire into. Thus, appellants' quarrel is with Con
gress, and it is a cause which can be pursued only at the polls and not in the courts.").
228.

See B aker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d

Cir. 1995).
229.

See supra text accompanying note 177 et seq.

230.

See supra text accompanying note 2 1 8 et seq.

See Oscar Schacter, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7 (1991)
("[G]overnments will weigh a possible breach by them against their interest in reciprocal obser
vance by the other party. They will also consider the likelihood of retaliation and other self-help
231.

measures by that party. Nor would they ignore the negative consequences of a reputation for repudi
ating their obligations.").
232.

For instance:

In part, the United States adheres to human rights conventions because it is concerned to main
tain leadership in international affairs by proving that it deserves it, by its behavior at home
and by its willingness to join in cooperative international efforts . .. . In larger part, the United
States is concerned to see minimum standards .. . observed in other countries in order to . . .
promote conditions that are conducive to U.S. prosperity and to U.S. interests in peace and se
curity.
HENKIN, supra note 30, at 475.In some cases, the United States has renegotiated treaties in order to
correct the conflict created by a later-in-time statute.President Chester A. Arthur vetoed the original
version of the Chinese Exclusion Act because it did not conform with an existing treaty. 13 CONG.
REC. 2551-52 (1882). The question has been posed whether the Conventions themselves need revi
sion to conform to the world of the 21st century. See E-mail from A.W.B . Simpson, Professor of
Law, University of Michigan Law School, to author ( Nov. 5, 2002, 10:28:00 E.S.T.) (on file with the
author).
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Reciprocity demands a longer-term view of both the objectives of the
Conventions and the possibility that the beneficiaries of the treaty obliga
tions might be United States citizens.233 The Noriega court's argument in

favor of enforcing the Convention obligations toward prisoners of war heav

ily emphasized the need to ensure similar treatment of United States troops
in the future.234 The court also justified its holding by noting that adherence

is necessary "[i]n order to set the roper example and avoid diminishing
g5
trust and respect of other nations."
The Conventions have wide scope236
7
and broad support,23 and there is thus a strong policy argument against

derogation and for reciprocity because future armed conflict is unpredict
able.23 s
Credibility plays a similar role in compelling adherence to treaties, in

particular treaties related to human rights and humanitarian action, due to

the fact that the United States publicly asserts that it is a strong advocate for

and supporter of higher global standards for individual rights throughout the
world.239 Derogation from treaty obligations that enforce such goals under
mines efforts at achieving them.240 The need for credibility is bound with the

233.

See supra note 175.

See United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 79 1 , 803 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (ordering the Attorney
General and the Bureau of Prisons to set sentencing keeping in mind "the importance to our own troops
234.

of faithful and, indeed, liberal adherence to the mandates of Geneva

III"); see also News Release,
Deceased (Mar. 23, 2003),

Headquarters United States Central Command, Coverage of POW's and

available at http://www.centcom.miVCENTCOMNews/News_Release.asp?NewsRelease=20030352.txt
(requesting that the media not publish images or other identifying information on United States
military held as prisoners of war in Iraq "[oJut of respect for the families and consistent with the
principles of Geneva Conventions").
235.

Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 802-03.

236.

The Conventions apply to "armed conflict," internal and international. See Common

Article 2, supra note 1 ("[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise . . .").
237.

1 90 nations are signatories to the Conventions. See Champ d 'application, supra note 5.

238.

See To Amend the United Nations Panicipation Act of 1 945 to Halt the lmponation of

Rhodesian Chrome and to Restore the U.S. to its Position as a Law Abiding Member of the Interna
tional Community: Hearing on S. 1868 Before the S. Subcomm. on African Affairs, Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 93d Cong. ( 1 973) (statement of John Scali, United States Ambassador to the
United Nations); Vagts, Observance and Breach, supra note 1 72, at 33 1 (overriding treaties by
internal action "is the most provocative of all tactics").
239.

See Department of State Protocol Il Letter, supra note 103, at 567 (''The United States

has traditionally been in the forefront of efforts to codify and improve the international rules of
humanitarian law"); Interview by Wolf Blitzer with Donald Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of
Defense, in Washington D.C. (March 23, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.usnews.clickability.
com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&expire=- l &urllD=5786054 (stating that Iraq must treat POWs "according to
the Geneva Convention, just as we treat Iraqi prisoners according to the Geneva Convention").
240.

For instance:

The United States cannot expect to reap the benefits of internationally recognized human
rights-in the form of greater worldwide stability and respect for people-without being will
ing to adhere to them itself. As a moral leader of the world, the United States had obligated
itself not to disregard rights uniformly recognized by other nations.
Beharry v. Reno, 1 83 F. Supp. 2d 584, 601 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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need for reciprocity ; enforcement of and adherence to international law
norms are not separable.

On the domestic plane, public perception and reaction play a role in dic

tating international policy. The media have disseminated information about
2
potential terrorist funding, 4 1 and Congress has addressed the issue in hear
22
ings with charitable organizations and other experts. 4 The Attorney General
has investigated, and continues to investigate, alleged schemes to portray

funds sent to support Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations as humani
2
tarian aid. 43 The acts of the United States toward non-combatants during

situations of armed conflict are visible and generate either support or lack of

support for the nation's military engagements. Policy decisions about provi
sion and prohibition of aid, therefore, must take into account public reaction
to humanitarian crises in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other nations in which the
2
United States military acts. 44 Exercise of the IEEPA override authority and

the consequent lack of sufficient humanitarian aid will increase the severity

of such crises and will diminish the credibility of the United States on the
domestic as well as the international plane.

Given the aforementioned objectives of reciprocity, credibility, self

interest, and domestic approval, the United States benefits by adhering to
25
the Conventions. 4 Humanitarian organizations provide support to the
United States in performance of its obligations because the nature of armed

conflict m akes it impossible for Parties themselves to fulfill the require
26
ments of the Conventions. 4 Former Secretary of State Colin Powell's
24 1 . See, e.g. , All Things Considered: Timing of Charity Shutdown Troubles Muslims (NPR
radio
broadcast
Oct.
26,
2004),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=4 1 2752 1 ; Four People, Charity Charged with Sending Millions to Iraq,
CNN.com, Feb. 26, 2003, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/02/26/charity.arrests.ap/
index.html.
242. Role of Charities and NGO's, supra note 47, at 2 (statement of Sen. Evan Bayh) ('This
hearing has been called to send a very clear signal that those who use the cover of humanitarian and
charitable efforts to hide their support for the murderous acts of terrorism should have no safe har
bor in our country").
243.

See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Crimi

nal Indictment Announcement, http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2004/Sep/20-829053.html (Sept.

1 7 , 2004) (listing examples of indictments against those accused of providing support to alleged
terrorists via charitable organizations established in the United States).
244. The decision as to whether to engage in humanitarian intervention often turns on the
public's reaction to, and perception of, humanitarian crises. For example, concerns over the fate of
Iraqi citizens were relevant to certain decisions related to the U.S. military's activities following the
March 2003 invasion. See Humanitarian Intervention: A Forum, NATION, July 1 4, 2003, available
at http://www.thenation.com/doc/200307 14/forum (discussing the relevance of human rights and
related concerns in the context of military interventions).
245.
See Vagts, Observance and Breach, supra note 1 72, at 329 ("[T]the weighing of longer
run interests in reputation and a stable international legal system against the immediate gains from
treaty defection is still a matter of instinct and judgment rather than calculation."); see also supra
note 1 3 1 and accompanying text regarding the G.W. Bush administration's increasing inclination
toward selective application of the Conventions.
246. See Rafa Vila San Juan, Sec'y Gen. & Chair, Steering Comm. for Humanitarian Re
sponse, Humanitarian Action Must Not be a Tool of Political Interests (July 1 8, 2002), available at
http://www.msf.org/msfintemational/invoke.cfm?objectid=065898A6-5322-4EE688C8BF97B39CB5AC ("Impartial humanitarian assistance is a response to an urgent and inalien-
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remark that non-governmental organizations are "a force multii;>lier for us
247
. . . an important part of our combat team" belies the Conventions' re
248
quirement of impartiality. Impartiality is a prerequisite for achieving the
goals of the Conventions. Humanitarian organizations that operate impar
tially and that join the ICRC as valid providers of humanitarian aid during
situations of armed conflict by law cannot be removed from that role, nor is
it in the U.S.'s interests to do so.
CONCLUSION

The President's ability to place unilateral restrictions on humanitarian
donations under IEEPA is overreaching and implementation of the override
authority creates an imminent risk of violations of international law in situa
tions of armed conflict. In addition, humanitarian organizations can be
reluctant to provide impartial aid in precisely the situations where it is
needed most because of the very existence of potential controls and their
sanctions. Courts have read the Charming Betsy doctrine narrowly in certain
contexts, such that IEEPA and the Conventions will not be read as consistent
in the circumstances relevant to the use of the override authority. The exis
tence of this conflict requires analysis under the later-in-time doctrine. The
later-in-time doctrine does not necessarily apply to the Conventions; more
over, use of the doctrine could result in legal and political repercussions
because of the particular nature of multilateral humanitarian treaties. Al
though courts and commentators conclude that the later-in-time doctrine is
viable with respect to domestic obligations, the doctrine should not apply
where domestic law bars not only domestic performance but also impedes
obligations on the international plane. In addition, policy considerations
preclude automatic use of the later-in-time rule. The "penumbra! obligation
24
of treaties," 9 particularly where the object is humanitarian aid, requires
25
narrow tailoring of measures to avoid support of terrorism. 0

able right in itself, whereas peace-making or peace-keeping operations inevitably have a partial and
political mandate. Which means . . . that civilian, humanitarian organisations cannot operate under
the command of the military.").
247. Colin Powell, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference,
(Oct. 26, 2001 ) (comments in relation to, inter alia, activities in Afghanistan in October 200 1 ).
248. See Common Articles 3 and 9/10; see also Iraq: Independent Humanitarian Aid under
Attack, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ideas/iraq_ l l - l 0-2003.cfm (last visited
July 5, 2006) ("[T]he US's attempt to partially j ustify its military goals as 'humanitarian' has seri
ously undermined the very principle of true humanitarian action: unconditional provision of
assistance to those in need without taking sides in a conflict.").
249.

Vagts, Observance and Breach, supra note 1 72, at 323.

250. Other laws, both domestic and international, exist to effectively control funding of terror
ists, a valid international concern. See supra note 98; see also Press Release, International
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War (Feb. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/i wpList74/26D99836026EA80DC 1 25686606 1 OC90
("The ICRC remains firmly convinced that compliance with international humanitarian law in no
manner constitutes an obstacle to the struggle against terror and crime.").
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